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Abstract
Information theoretically secure multi-party computation (MPC) has been a central primitive of
modern cryptography. However, relatively little is known about the communication complexity of
this primitive.
In this work, we develop powerful information theoretic tools to prove lower bounds on the
communication complexity of MPC. We restrict ourselves to a concrete setting involving 3-parties,
in order to bring out the power of these tools without introducing too many complications. Our
techniques include the use of a data processing inequality for residual information — i.e., the gap
between mutual information and Gács-Körner common information, a new information inequality
for 3-party protocols, and the idea of distribution switching by which lower bounds computed under
certain worst-case scenarios can be shown to apply for the general case.
Using these techniques we obtain tight bounds on communication complexity by MPC pro-
tocols for various interesting functions. In particular, we show concrete functions which have
“communication-ideal” protocols, which achieve the minimum communication simultaneously on
all links in the network. Also, we obtain the first explicit example of a function that incurs a higher
communication cost than the input length, in the secure computation model of Feige, Kilian and
Naor [FKN94], who had shown that such functions exist. We also show that our communication
bounds imply tight lower bounds on the amount of randomness required by MPC protocols for many
interesting functions.
We identify a multi-secret sharing primitive that is interesting on its own right, but also has the
property that lower bounds on its share sizes serve as lower bounds for communication complexity
of MPC protocols. While often the resulting bounds are tight, we can use our results to give a
concrete example where there is a gap between the share sizes and the communication complexity.
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1 Introduction
Information theoretically secure multi-party computation has been a central primitive of modern cryp-
tography. The seminal results of Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson [BGW88] and Chaum, Crépeau,
and Damgård [CCD88] showed that information theoretically secure function computation is possible
between parties connected by pairwise, private links as long as only a strict minority may collude in
the honest-but-curious model (and a strictly less than one-third minority may collude in the malicious
model). Since then, several protocols have improved the efficiency of these protocols.
However, relatively less is known about lower bounds on the amount of communication required by a
secure multi-party computation protocol, with a few notable exceptions [Kus89, FY92, CK93, FKN94].
In fact, [IK04] shows that establishing strong communication lower bounds (even with restrictions on
the number of rounds) would imply breakthrough lower bound results for other well-studied problems
like private-information retrieval and locally decodable codes. Further, due to known upper bounds
on the communication needed in a secure multi-party computation protocol [DI06], such lower bounds
would imply non-trivial circuit complexity lower bounds — a notoriously hard problem in theoretical
computer science. The goal of this work is to develop tools to tackle the difficult problem of lower
bounds for communication in secure multi-party computation, even if they do not immediately have
direct implications to circuit complexity or locally decodable codes.
It is instructive to compare the problem of communication complexity lower bounds for secure multi-
party computation with that when there is no security requirement involved. This latter problem has
been extensively studied — over the last three and a half decades, starting with [Yao79] — resulting
in a rich collection of results and techniques. Unfortunately, many of the techniques in the commu-
nication complexity setting are not relevant in the setting of secure computation:1 for instance, for
communication complexity Yao’s minimax theorem allows one to consider only deterministic protocols
with public randomness, but in the secure computation setting, one must allow private randomness,
and hence it is not sufficient to consider only deterministic protocols. This rules out several powerful
combinatorial approaches from the communication complexity literature. But over the last decade or
so (see for example, [KLL+12] and references therein), a slew of information theoretic tools have been
developed, which in many cases subsume more complicated combinatorial approaches.
Following this lead, the approach we take in this work is to develop novel information-theoretic
tools to obtain lower bounds on the communication complexity of secure computation. Indeed, the tools
we develop and use have connections with similar tools developed in the context of communication
complexity and related problems. In particular, all these tools are related to notions of “common
information” introduced by Gács-Körner [GK73] and Wyner [Wyn75].2
In this work we restrict our study to a concrete setting that brings out the power of these tools
without introducing too many additional complications. Our setting involves 3 parties (with security
against corruption of any single party) of which only two parties have inputs, X and Y , and only
the third party receives an output Z as a (possibly randomized) function of the inputs. This class of
functions is similar to that studied in [FKN94], but our protocol model is more general (since it allows
fully interactive communication), making it harder to establish lower bounds.
1Of course, communication complexity lower bounds continue to hold for secure computation as well, but these bounds
as such are (apparently) very loose (since there is a trivial upper bound for communication complexity, which is at most
the size of all inputs and outputs).
2In communication complexity and related problems, the lower bound techniques relate to Wyner common informa-
tion [PP, BP13], whereas the tools in this work are more directly related to Gács-Körner common information. Wyner
common information and Gács-Körner common information have been generalized to a measure of correlation represented
as the “tension region” in [PP12].
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1.1 Results and Techniques
We study the setting shown in Figure 1. We obtain lower bounds on the expected number of bits that
need to be exchanged between each pair of parties when securely evaluating a (possibly randomized)
function of two inputs so that Alice and Bob have one input each, and Charlie receives the output. In
fact, our bounds are on the entropy of the transcript between each pair,3 and hence hold even when
the protocol is amortized over several instances with independent inputs. Further, these bounds do
not depend on the input distribution (as long as the distribution has full support) and hold even if the
protocol is allowed to depend on the input distribution.
At a high-level, the ingredients in deriving of our lower-bounds are the following:
• Firstly, we observe that, since Alice and Bob do not obtain any outputs, they are both forced to
reveal their inputs fully (upto equivalent inputs) to the rest of the system. This implies that the
transcripts of a secure computation form the shares of the inputs and outputs according to an
appropriately defined “correlated multiple secret sharing scheme” (CMSS).4 Hence, lower bounds on
the entropies of the shares in a CMSS imply lower bounds on the entropies of the messages in a
secure computation protocol. One can immediately obtain a naïve lower bound on the entropies of
the shares in a correlated multiple secret sharing scheme: specifically, if X,Y, Z are the secrets, and
M23 denotes the part of shares that is not available to a party who should learn only X, then we can
see that H(M23) ≥ H(Y,Z|X).5
We strengthen the naïve lower bounds by relying on a “data-processing inequality” for residual in-
formation — i.e., the gap between mutual-information and (Gács-Körner) common information —
which lets us relate the residual information between the shares to the residual information between
the secrets. This bound is given in Theorem 1.
• We can further improve the above lower bounds using a new tool, called distribution switching. The
key idea is that the security requirement forces the distribution of the transcript on certain links to be
independent of the inputs. Hence, we can optimize our bounds over all input distributions having full
support. Further, this shows that even if the protocol is allowed to depend on the input distribution,
our bounds (which depend only on the function being evaluated) hold for every input distribution
that has full support over the input domain. The resulting bound is summarised in Theorem 2.
• As it turns out, CMSS lower bounds are in general weak, because a CMSS can in fact be strictly
more efficient than a secure computation protocol that the CMSS problem is derived from (see
Appendix C). To go beyond the CMSS bounds, we need to exploit the fact that in a protocol, the
transcripts have to be generated by the parties interactively, rather than be created by an omniscient
“dealer”. An important technical contribution of this work is to provide a new tool towards this, in
the form of a new information inequality for 3-party interactive protocols (Lemma 4). We use this to
derive a bound (Theorem 3) that serves as an intermediate result for us.
3The entropy bounds translate to bounds on the expected number of bits communicated, when we require that the
messages on the individual links are encoded using (possibly adaptively chosen) prefix-free codes. See Appendix B.
4We remark that our notion of multiple secret sharing schemes is different from that of [BSC+94], which (implicitly)
required that secrets with different access structures be independent of each other. In our case, Z is typically strongly
correlated with X,Y , often via a deterministic function.
5 We point out a simple example for which one can obtain a tight bound from this naïve bound for CMSS: addition (in
any group) requires one group element to be communicated between every pair of players, even with amortization over
several independent instances. Previous lower bounds for secure evaluation of addition (in any group) [FY92, CK93], while
considering an arbitrary number of parties, either restricted themselves to bounding the number of messages required,
or relied on non-standard security requirements. (For the 3-party case, for semi-honest security, results of [FY92, CK93]
only imply that all three links should be used. [FY92] did give a lower bound on the number of bits communicated as
well, but this was shown only under a non-standard security requirement called unstoppability.)
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Figure 1 A three-party secure computation problem. Alice (party-1) has input X and Bob (party-2) has Y . We require
that (i) Charlie (party-3) obtains as output a randomized function of the other two parties’ inputs, distributed as pZ|XY ,
(ii) Alice and Bob learn no additional information about each other’s inputs, and (iii) Charlie learns nothing more about
X,Y than what is revealed by Z. All parties can talk to each other, over multiple rounds over bidirectional pairwise
private links.
Using the idea of distribution switching, we can significantly improve the above lower bounds by
optimizing them using appropriate distributions of inputs. In fact, we can take the different terms
in our bounds and optimize each of them separately using different distributions over the inputs.
The resulting bounds (Theorem 4 and Theorem 5) are often stronger than what can be obtained by
considering a single input distribution for the entire expression.
The resulting bounds are summarized in Theorem 1, Theorem 2, Theorem 4 and Theorem 5. While
we restrict our attention to a 3 party setting, to the best of our knowledge, these are the first generic
lower bounds which apply to any function. To illustrate their use, we apply them to several interesting
example functions. In particular, we show the following:
• We analyze secure protocols for two functions – group-add, controlled-erasure and remote-
ot – and, applying our lower bounds, show that these protocols achieve optimal communication
complexity simultaneously on each link. We call such a protocol a communication-ideal protocol. We
leave it open to characterize which functions have communication-ideal protocols.
• We use our lower bounds to establish a separation between secret sharing and secure computation:
we show that there exists a function (in fact, the and function) which has a CMSS scheme with
a share strictly smaller than the number of bits in the transcript on the corresponding link in any
secure computation protocol for that function. While such a separation is natural to expect, we note
that proving it requires exploiting the properties of an interactive protocol.
• We show an explicit deterministic function f : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−1 which has a communication-
ideal protocol in which Charlie’s total communication cost is (and must be at least) 3n− 1 bits. In
contrast, [FKN94] showed that there exist functions f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, for which Charlie
must receive at least 3n−4 bits, if the protocol is required to be in their non-interactive model. (Note
that our bound is incomparable to that of [FKN94], since we require the output of our function to
be longer; on the other hand, our bound uses an explicit function, and continues to hold even if we
allow unrestricted interaction.)
• Our lower bounds for communication complexity also yield lower bounds on the amount of randomness
needed in secure computation protocols. We analyze secure protocols for group-add, controlled-
erasure, remote-ot and sum, and prove that these protocols are randomness-optimal, i.e., they
use the least amount of randomness.
3
1.2 Related Work
Communication complexity of multi-party computation without security requirements has been widely
studied since [Yao79] (see [KN97]), and more recently has seen the use of information-theoretic tools
as well, in [CSWY01] and subsequent works. Independently, in the information theory literature com-
munication requirements of interactive function computation have been studied (e.g. [OR01]).
In secure multi-party computation, there has been a vast literature on information-theoretic secu-
rity, focusing on building efficient protocols, as well as characterizing various aspects like corruption
models that admit secure protocols (e.g. [BGW88, CCD88, Cha89, HM97, FHM99, HLMR12]) and
the number of rounds of interaction needed (e.g. [FL82, GIKR01, FGG+06, PCRR09, KKK09]), In
the computational security setting, [NN01] gave upper bounds on the communication complexity of
2-party secure computation in terms of the communication complexity without security requirements.
In the information-theoretic security setting, [DI06] upper bounded the communication complexity of
multi-party secure computation in terms of the circuit complexity of the computation.
But lower-bounding communication complexity has received much less attention. For 2-party secure
computation with security against passive corruption of one party (when the function admits such a
protocol), communication complexity was combinatorially characterized in [Kus89]. Franklin and Yung
[FY92] showed that the number of messages used in a protocol must be quadratic in n, the number of
parties (if security against corrupting t = Ω(n) parties is required). Further [FY92, CK93] gave tight
lower and upper bounds on the number of messages needed for secure computation of the “modulo-
sum” function by n parties; relying on a stronger corruption model (fail-stop corruption), [FY92] also
argued a lower bound for the amortized communication complexity of secure summation. [FKN94]
obtained a lower bound on the communication complexity for a restricted class of 3-party protocols;
along with positive results, they gave a modest lower bound for communication needed for evaluating
random functions in this model. The difficulty of obtaining general lower bounds was pointed out
in [IK04], who related such lower bounds to lower bounds for locally decodable codes and private
information retrieval protocols. The connection to private information retrieval protocols was recently
used in [BIKK14] to, among other things, derive the best known general upper bound on communication
for Boolean functions in the model of [FKN94]. Note that this upper bound is exponential in the number
of input bits compared to the lower bound of [FKN94] which is only linear. The question of how much
randomness is required for secure computation seems to have received even less attention; we are aware
of [KM97, BSPV99, GR05, LA14].
Information-theoretic tools have been successfully used in deriving bounds in various cryptographic
problems like key agreement (e.g. [MW03]), secure 2-party computation (e.g. [DM99]) and secret-
sharing and its variants (e.g. [BO11] and [BSC+94]). In this work, we rely on information-theoretic
tools developed in [WW08, PP12], which also considered cryptographic problems. Some preliminary
observations leading to this work appeared in [DP13] (as referenced at the appropriate points, below).
2 Preliminaries
Notation. We write pX to denote the distribution of a discrete random variable X; pX(x) denotes
Pr[X = x]. When clear from the context, the subscript of pX will be omitted. The conditional
distribution denoted by pZ|U specifies Pr[Z = z|U = u], for each value z that Z can take and each value
u that U can take. A randomized function of two variables, is specified by a probability distribution
pZ|XY , where X,Y denote the two input variables, and Z denotes the output variable. For a sequence
of random variables X1, X2, . . . , we denote by Xn the vector (X1, . . . , Xn).
For random variables T,U, V, we write the Markov chain T − U − V to indicate that T and V are
conditionally independent conditioned on U : i.e., I(T ;V |U) = 0. All logarithms are to the base 2. The
binary entropy function is denoted by H2(p) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p), p ∈ (0, 1).
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Protocols. A 3-party protocol Π is specified by a collection of “next message functions” (Π1,Π2,Π3)
which probabilistically map a state of the protocol to the next state (in a restricted manner), and output
functions (Πout1 ,Πout2 ,Πout3 ) used to define the outputs of the parties as probabilistic functions of their
views. We shall also allow the protocol to depend on the distribution of the inputs to the parties. (This
would allow one to tune a protocol to be efficient for a suitable input distribution. Allowing this makes
our lower bounds stronger; on the other hand, none of the protocols we give for our examples require
this flexibility. See discussion in Appendix H.)
In Appendix A we formalize a well-formed 3-party protocol. Without loss of generality, the state
of the protocol consists only of the inputs received by each party and the transcript of the messages
exchanged so far.6 We denote the final transcripts on the three links, after executing protocol Π on its
specified input distribution by MΠ12,MΠ23 and MΠ31. When Π is clear from the context, we simply write
M12 etc. We define M1 = (M12,M31) as the transcripts that party 1 can see; M2 and M3 are defined
similarly. We define the view of the ith party, Vi to consist of Mi and that party’s inputs and outputs
(if any).
It is easy to see that a (well-formed) protocol, along with an input distribution, fully defines a joint
distribution over all the inputs, outputs and the joint transcripts on all the links.
Secure Computation. We consider three party computation functionalities, in which Alice and
Bob (parties 1 and 2) receive as inputs the random variables X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y, respectively, and
Charlie (party 3) produces an output Z ∈ Z distributed according to a specified distribution pZ|XY . In
particular, we can consider a deterministic function evaluation functionality where Z = f(X,Y ) with
probability 1, for some function f : X × Y → Z. The set X , Y and Z are always finite. In secure
computation, we shall consider the inputs to the computation to come from a distribution pXY over
X × Y.
A (perfectly) secure computation protocol Π(pXY , pZ|XY ) = (Π1,Π2,Π3,Πout3 ) for (pXY , pZ|XY ) is
a protocol which satisfies the following conditions:
• Correctness: Output of Charlie, is distributed according to pZ|X=x,Y=y, where x, y are the inputs to
Alice and Bob
• Privacy: The privacy condition corresponds to “1-privacy”, wherein at most one party is passively
corrupt. Corresponding to security against Alice, Bob and Charlie, respectively, we have the following
three Markov chains. M1 − X − (Y, Z), M2 − Y − (X,Z) and M3 − Z − (X,Y ). Equivalently, in
terms of the views, I(V1; (Y,Z)|X) = I(V2; (X,Z)|Y ) = I(V3; (X,Y )|Z) = 0.
Intuitively, the privacy condition guarantees that even if one party (say Alice) is curious, and retains
its view from the protocol (i.e., M1), this view reveals nothing more to it about the inputs and outputs
of the other parties (namely, Y,Z), than what its own inputs and outputs reveal (as long as the other
parties erase their own views). In other words, a curious party may as well simulate a view for itself
based on just its inputs and outputs, rather than retain the actual view it obtained from the protocol
execution.
For simplicity, we prove all our results for perfect security as defined above; this is also the setting
for classical positive results like that of [BGW88]. But all our bounds do extend to the setting of
statistical security, as we shall show in the full version of this paper (following [WW10, PP12] who
extend similar results to the statistical security case).7 Also, the above security requirements are for an
6Since the parties are computationally unbounded, there is no need to allow private randomness as part of the state;
randomness for a party can always be resampled at every round conditioned on the inputs, outputs and messages in that
party’s view.
7We remark that we do not know if our bounds extend to a relaxed security setting sometimes considered in the
information theory literature: there the error in security is only required to go to 0 as the size of the input grows to
infinity. Instead, we use the standard cryptographic security requirement that for any fixed input length, the error can
be driven arbitrarily close to zero by choosing a large enough security parameter.
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honest execution of the protocol (corresponding to honest-but-curious or passive corruption of at most
one party). The lower bounds derived in this model typically continue to hold for active corruption
as well (since for many functionalities, every protocol secure against active corruption is a protocol
secure against passive corruption), but in fact, in our setting (where 1 out of 3 parties is corrupted),
the functions we consider simply do not have secure protocols against active corruption.
Communication Complexity and Entropy. A standard approach to lowerbounding the number
of bits in a string is to lowerbound its entropy. However, in an interactive setting, a party sees the
messages in each round, rather than just a concatenation of all the bits sent over the entire protocol.
In a setting where we allow variable length messages, this would seem to allow communicating more
bits of information than the length of the transcript itself. But this allows the parties to learn when the
message transmitted in a round ends, implicitly inserting an end-of-message marker into the bit stream.
To account for this, one can require that the message sent at every round is a codeword in a prefix-free
code. (The code itself can be dynamically determined based on previous messages exchanged over the
link.) As shown in Appendix B, with this requirement, the number of bits communicated in each link
is indeed lowerbounded by the entropy of the transcript in that link.
Normal Forms. In Appendix A, we describe a normal form for a randomized function pZ|XY as
well as for the pair (pXY , pZ|XY ), where pXY and pZ|XY are the input distribution and the function
respectively. Essentially, these normal forms merge “equivalent” inputs and outputs. As argued there,
it suffices to study the communication complexity of secure computation for functions pZ|XY and for
pairs (pXY , pZ|XY ) in normal form.
Communication-Ideal Protocol. We say that a protocol Π(pXY , pZ|XY ) for securely computing a
randomized function pZ|XY , for a distribution pXY is communication-ideal if for each ij ∈ {12, 23, 31},
H(MΠij ) = inf
Π′(pXY ,pZ|XY )
H(MΠ
′
ij ),
where the infimum is over all secure protocols for pZ|XY with the same distribution pXY . That is, a
communication-ideal protocol achieves the least entropy possible for every link, simultaneously. We
remark that it is not clear, a priori, how to determine if a given function pZ|XY has a communication-
ideal protocol for a given distribution pXY .
Common Information and Residual Information
Gács and Körner [GK73] introduced the notion of common information to measure a certain aspect of
correlation between two random variables. The Gács-Körner common information of a pair of correlated
random variables (U, V ) can be defined as H(U uV ), where U uV is a random variable with maximum
entropy among all random variables Q that are determined both by U and by V (i.e., there are functions
f and g such that Q = f(U) = g(V )). In [PP12], the gap between mutual information and common
information was termed residual information: RI(U ;V ) := I(U ;V )−H(U u V ).
In [WW08], Wolf and Wullschleger identified (among other things) the following important data
processing inequality for residual information.
Lemma 1 ([WW08]). If T,U, V,W are jointly distributed random variables such that the following two
Markov chains hold: (i) U − T −W , and (ii) T −W − V , then
RI(T ;W ) ≤ RI((U, T ); (V,W )).
The Markov chain conditions above correspond to the requirement that it is secure (against honest-
but-curious adversaries) to require a pair of parties holding the views (U, T ) and (V,W ), to produce
outputs T,W , respectively, because for the first party, the rest of its view, U , can be simulated based
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on the output T , independent of the output W (and similarly, for the second party). The lemma
states that under such a secure transformation from views to outputs, the residual information can only
decrease.
In [PP12], the following alternate definition of residual information was given, which will be useful
in lowerbounding conditional mutual information terms.
RI(U ;V ) = min
Q:∃f,g s.t.
Q=f(U)=g(V )
I(U ;V |Q). (1)
The random variableQ which achieves the minimum is, in fact, UuV . Note that the residual information
is always non-negative.
3 Lower Bounds on Communication Complexity
This section is divided into three parts. In Subsection 3.1, we derive preliminary lower bounds for
secure computation. In each of the subsequent subsections, we give different improvements of the lower
bounds derived in Subsection 3.1.
3.1 Preliminary Lower Bounds
We first state the following basic lemma for any protocol for secure computation. Similar results have
appeared in the literature earlier (for instance, special cases of Lemma 2 appear in [DM00, WW10,
DP13]).
Lemma 2 states the simple fact that, for (pXY , pZ|XY ) in normal form, the information about a
party’s input must flow out through the links she/he is part of, and the information about Charlie’s
output must flow in through the links he is part of. This crucially relies on the fact that Alice and Bob
obtain no output, and Charlie has no input in our model.
Lemma 2. Suppose (pXY , pZ|XY ) is in normal form. Then, in any secure protocol Π(pXY , pZ|XY ),
the cut isolating Alice from Bob and Charlie must reveal Alice’s input X, i.e., H(X|M12,M31) = 0.
Similarly, H(Y |M12,M23) = 0 and H(Z|M23,M31) = 0.
A proof is given in Appendix E. We obtain a preliminary lower bound in Theorem 1 below by using
the above lemma and the data-processing inequality for residual information in Lemma 1. Note that
the assumption of (pXY , pZ|XY ) being in normal form below is without loss of generality (Appendix A).
Theorem 1. Any secure protocol Π(pXY , pZ|XY ), where (pXY , pZ|XY ) is in normal form, should satisfy
the following lower bounds on the entropy of the transcripts on each link.
H(M23) ≥ max{RI(X;Z), RI(X;Y )}+H(Y,Z|X), (2)
H(M31) ≥ max{RI(Y ;Z), RI(X;Y )}+H(X,Z|Y ), (3)
H(M12) ≥ max{RI(X;Z), RI(Y ;Z)}+H(X,Y |Z). (4)
Proof. We shall prove (2). The other two inequalities follow symmetrically.
H(M23) ≥ max{H(M23|M31), H(M23|M12)}
= max{I(M23;M12|M31), I(M23;M31|M12)}+H(M23|M12,M31). (5)
Firstly, we can bound the last term of (5) as follows (to already get a naïve bound):
H(M23|M12,M31) (a)= H(M23, Y, Z|M12,M31, X)
≥ H(Y,Z|M12,M31, X) (b)= H(Y,Z|X),
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where (a) follows from Lemma 2 and (b) follows from the privacy against Alice. Next, we lower bound
the first term inside max of (5) by RI(X;Z) as follows. Firstly,
I(M23;M12|M31) = I(M23,M31;M12,M31|M31) ≥ RI(M23,M31;M12,M31), (6)
where the inequality follows from (1), the alternate definition of residual information, by taking Q =
M31. Now, by privacy against Charlie, we have (M23,M31)−Z−X and privacy against Alice, we have
(M12,M31) −X − Z. Applying Lemma 1 with the above markov chains, together with Lemma 2, we
get
RI(M23,M31;M12,M31) ≥ RI(Z;X) = RI(X;Z).
Similarly, we can lower bound the second term inside max of (5) by RI(X;Y ), completing the proof.
A consequence of Lemma 2 is that the transcripts in a secure computation protocol form shares in a
CMSS scheme for the same distribution pXY Z = pXY pZ|XY ; see Appendix C. There we derive bounds
on the sizes of these shares which, in fact, imply Theorem 1 (and Theorem 2). In the rest of the paper
we will restrict our attention to pXY which have full support (and, without loss of generality, pZ|XY
expressed in normal form). This will allow us to strengthen the preliminary bounds in Theorem 1.
Notice that such (pXY , pZ|XY ) are in normal form and hence Lemma 2 holds.
3.2 Distribution Switching and Improved Lower Bounds - I
To improve the bounds in Theorem 1, we give a technique, distribution switching, which significantly
improves the above bounds and leads to one of our main theorems.
The following lemma states that privacy requirements imply that the transcript M12 generated by
a secure protocol computing pZ|XY is independent of both the inputs. Moreover, if the function pZ|XY
satisfies some additional constraints, then the other two transcripts also become independent of the
inputs. For a distribution pXY , a bipartite graph on vertex set X ∪ Y is said to be the characteristic
bipartite graph of pXY , if x ∈ X and y ∈ Y are connected whenever pXY (x, y) > 0. The proof of the
following lemma is along the lines of a similar lemma in [DP13] and we prove it in Appendix E for
completeness.
Lemma 3. Consider a function pZ|XY not necessarily in normal form.
1. Suppose that pXY is such that the characteristic bipartite graph of pXY is connected. Then, for any
secure protocol Π(pXY , pZ|XY ), we have I(X,Y, Z;M12) = 0.
2. Suppose pXY has full support and pZ|XY satisfies the following condition:
Condition 1. There is no non-trivial partition X = X1 ∪X2 (i.e., X1 ∩X2 = ∅ and neither X1 nor
X2 is empty), such that if Zk = {z ∈ Z : x ∈ Xk, y ∈ Y, p(z|x, y) > 0}, k = 1, 2, their intersection
Z1 ∩ Z2 is empty.
Then, for any secure protocol Π(pXY , pZ|XY ), we have I(X,Y, Z;M31) = 0.
3. Suppose pXY has full support and pZ|XY satisfies the following condition:
Condition 2. There is no non-trivial partition Y = Y1 ∪ Y2 such that if Zk = {z ∈ Z : x ∈ X , y ∈
Yk, p(z|x, y) > 0}, k = 1, 2, their intersection Z1 ∩ Z2 is empty.
Then, for any secure protocol Π(pXY , pZ|XY ), we have I(X,Y, Z;M23) = 0.
We point out that pXY having a connected characteristic bipartite graph is a weaker condition than
pXY having full support.
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Distribution Switching
We will now strengthen the lower bounds from Theorem 1. Specifically, we will argue that even if
the protocol is allowed to depend on the input distribution (as we do here), privacy requirements will
require that the lower bounds derived for when the distributions of the inputs are changed continue to
hold for the original setting.
We note that any secure protocol Π(pXY , pZ|XY ), where distribution pXY has full support, continues
to be a secure protocol even if we switch the input distribution to a different one pX′Y ′ . This follows
directly from examining the correctness and privacy conditions required for a protocol to be secure.
Theorem 2. For any secure protocol Π(pXY , pZ|XY ), where pZ|XY is in normal form and pXY has full
support, we have the following strengthening of (4):
H(M12) ≥ max{ sup
pX′Y ′
(
RI(X ′;Z ′) +H(X ′, Y ′|Z ′)) , sup
pX′Y ′
(
RI(Y ′;Z ′) +H(X ′, Y ′|Z ′))}, (7)
where the supremizations are over pX′Y ′ having full support and the objective functions are evaluated
using pX′Y ′Z′(x, y, z) = pX′Y ′(x, y)pZ|XY (z|x, y).
If pZ|XY (in normal form) satisfies Condition 1 of Lemma 3, then for any secure protocol Π(pXY , pZ|XY ),
where pXY has full support, we have the following strengthening of (3):
H(M31) ≥ max{ sup
pX′Y ′
(
RI(Y ′;Z ′) +H(X ′, Z ′|Y ′)) , sup
pX′Y ′
(
RI(X ′;Y ′) +H(X ′, Z ′|Y ′))}, (8)
where the supremizations are over pX′Y ′ having full support and the objective functions are evaluated
using pX′Y ′Z′(x, y, z) = pX′Y ′(x, y)pZ|XY (z|x, y).
If pZ|XY (in normal form) satisfies Condition 2 of Lemma 3, then for any secure protocol Π(pXY , pZ|XY ),
where pXY has full support, we have the following strengthening of (2):
H(M23) ≥ max{ sup
pX′Y ′
(
RI(X ′;Z ′) +H(Y ′, Z ′|X ′)) , sup
pX′Y ′
(
RI(X ′;Y ′) +H(Y ′, Z ′|X ′))}, (9)
where the supremizations are over pX′Y ′ having full support and the objective functions are evaluated
using pX′Y ′Z′(x, y, z) = pX′Y ′(x, y)pZ|XY (z|x, y).
Proof. By Lemma 3, it follows that the transcript M12 of the protocol (under both the original and the
switched input distributions) must remain independent of the input data X,Y . This allows us to argue
using Theorem 1, that
H(M12) ≥ max{ sup
pX′Y ′
(
RI(X ′;Z ′) +H(X ′, Y ′|Z ′)) , sup
pX′Y ′
(
RI(Y ′;Z ′) +H(X ′, Y ′|Z ′))},
where the supremizations are over pX′Y ′ having full support and the objective functions are evaluated
using pX′Y ′Z′(x, y, z) = pX′Y ′(x, y)pZ|XY (z|x, y).
Similarly, if the function pZ|XY satisfies the condition 1 and 2 of Lemma 3, we can show the other
two bounds on H(M31) and H(M23) as well.
In Appendix C, we derive similar bounds for the size of the shares of a CMSS scheme.
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3.3 An Information Inequality for Protocols and Improved Lower Bounds - II
We can give a different improvement to Theorem 1 by exploiting the fact that in a protocol, transcripts
are generated by the parties interactively, rather than by an omniscient dealer. Towards this, we derive
an information inequality relating the transcripts on different links in general 3-party protocols, in
which parties do not share any common or correlated randomness or correlated inputs at the beginning
of the protocol. Note that our model for protocols does indeed satisfy these conditions when the inputs
are independent of each other.
Lemma 4. In any well-formed 3-party protocol, if the inputs to the parties are independent of each
other, then, for {α, β, γ} = {1, 2, 3},
I(Mγα;Mβγ) ≥ I(Mγα;Mβγ |Mαβ).
We prove the lemma in Appendix E. We further note that, as in (6), I(Mγα;Mβγ |Mαβ) ≥
RI(MγαMαβ;MβγMαβ). Hence, if the inputs are independent of each other,
I(Mγα;Mβγ) ≥ I(Mγα;Mβγ |Mαβ) ≥ RI(MγαMαβ;MβγMαβ). (10)
This inequality provides us with a means to exploit the protocol structure behind transcripts. Below,
Theorem 3 (specifically, (13)) shows that the term max{RI(X;Z), RI(Y ;Z)} in (4) can be replaced
by RI(X;Z) + RI(Y ;Z). Note that Theorem 3 is stated and proven for independent inputs, that is,
pXY = pXpY . In Appendix G we show that (using ideas of distribution switching from Subsection 3.2)
it implies lower bounds for dependent inputs pXY with full support as well. However, this extension is
not required in the sequel where we derive our main theorems.
Theorem 3. Any secure protocol Π(pXpY , pZ|XY ), where pZ|XY is in normal form and pX , pY have
full support, should satisfy the following lower bounds on the entropy of the transcripts on each link.
H(M23) ≥ RI(X;Z) +H(Y,Z|X) (11)
H(M31) ≥ RI(Y ;Z) +H(X,Z|Y ) (12)
H(M12) ≥ RI(X;Z) +RI(Y ;Z) +H(X,Y |Z) (13)
Proof. Firstly, note that (11) and (12) follow from (2) and (3). To prove (13), we have
H(M12) = I(M12;M23) +H(M12|M23)
= I(M12;M23) + I(M12;M31|M23) +H(M12|M23,M31)
≥ RI(X;Z) +RI(Y ;Z) +H(X,Y |Z),
where the last inequality used H(M12|M23,M31) ≥ H(X,Y |Z) and I(M12;M31|M23) ≥ RI(Y ;Z)
(both as in the proof of Theorem 1) as well as I(M12;M23) ≥ RI(X;Z) (by (10), which applies since
we assume independent inputs).
In Appendix C we show that the above proof can be extended to derive lower bounds for secure sampling.
We can improve the bounds in Theorem 3 using distribution switching which leads to our main
theorems. The following lemma states that if the inputs X and Y are independent, then privacy
requirements imply that certain transcripts generated by a secure protocol computing pZ|XY , are inde-
pendent of certain data. More precisely, we show the following.
Lemma 5. For any secure protocol Π(pXpY , pZ|XY ), where pZ|XY may not be in normal form, should
satisfy I(X;M23) = I(Y ;M31) = 0.
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Proof. I(X;M23) = 0 follows from I(X;M23) ≤ I(X;M23, Y ) = I(X;Y )+ I(X;M23|Y ) = 0, where
the last equality follows from independence of X and Y and privacy against Bob. Similarly we can
show I(Y ;M31) = 0.
If the inputs X and Y are independent, i.e., pXY = pXpY , then the transcripts M23 and M31 of the
protocol (under both the original and the switched input distributions) must remain independent of X
and Y respectively (by Lemma 5). Note that for the independence of M12 and (X,Y ), we do not need
the independence of inputs. Rather, since we used Lemma 4 (which requires independence of inputs)
to get (13), we are forced to consider independent inputs if we use the bound on H(M12) in (13). This
allows us to argue using Theorem 3, that
H(M12) ≥ sup
pX′pY ′
RI(X ′;Z ′) +RI(Y ′;Z ′) +H(X ′, Y ′|Z ′),
where the supremum is over pX′ , pY ′ which have full support and the terms in the right hand side are
evaluated under the joint distribution
pX′,Y ′,Z′(x, y, z) = pX′(x)pY ′(y)pZ|X,Y (z|x, y).
Similarly, from Lemma 5, we know thatM31 is independent of Y , andM23 is independent of X. Hence,
H(M31) ≥ sup
pY ′
RI(Y ′;Z ′) +H(X,Z ′|Y ′), (14)
H(M23) ≥ sup
pX′
RI(X ′;Z ′) +H(Y,Z ′|X ′), (15)
where the right hand side of (14) is evaluated under pX,Y ′,Z′(x, y, z) = pX(x)pY ′(y)pZ|X,Y (z|x, y).
Similarly, for the bound on H(M23).
In fact, we can show an even stronger bound than above by a more careful application of distribu-
tion switching. This leads us to second of our three main lower bound theorems, which is proved in
Appendix D.
Remark: The above discussion of distribution switching used Lemma 5, which holds for independent
inputs, that is, pXY = pXpY . However, as we argue in Appendix G, the resulting lower bounds also
hold for dependent inputs pXY with full support; we state the theorem for this general case.
Theorem 4. The following communication complexity bounds hold for any secure protocol Π(pXY , pZ|XY ),
where pZ|X,Y is in normal form and pXY has full support:
H(M23) ≥
(
sup
pX′
RI(X ′;Z ′)
)
+
(
sup
pX′′
H(Y,Z ′′|X ′′)
)
, (16)
H(M31) ≥
(
sup
pY ′
RI(Y ′;Z ′)
)
+
(
sup
pY ′′
H(X,Z ′′|Y ′′)
)
, (17)
H(M12) ≥ max
 suppX′
(
suppY ′ RI(Y
′;Z ′)
)
+
(
suppY ′′ RI(X
′;Z ′′) +H(X ′, Y ′′|Z ′′)
)
,
suppY ′
(
suppX′ RI(X
′;Z ′)
)
+
(
suppX′′ RI(Y
′;Z ′′) +H(X ′′, Y ′|Z ′′)
)  , (18)
where the supremizations are over distributions pX′ , pX′′ , pY ′ , pY ′′ having full support. The terms in the
right hand side of (16) are evaluated using the distribution pY of the data Y of Bob, i.e.,
pX′,Y,Z′(x, y, z) = pX′(x)pY (y)pZ|X,Y (z|x, y),
pX′′,Y,Z′′(x, y, z) = pX′′(x)pY (y)pZ|X,Y (z|x, y).
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Similarly, the terms in (17) are evaluated using the the distribution pX of the data X of Alice. The
lower bound in (18) does not depend on the distributions pX and pY of the data. The terms on the top
row of (18), for instance, are evaluated using
pX′,Y ′,Z′(x, y, z) = pX′(x)pY ′(y)pZ|X,Y (z|x, y),
pX′,Y ′′,Z′′(x, y, z) = pX′(x)pY ′′(y)pZ|X,Y (z|x, y).
When the function satisfies certain additional constraints, we can strengthen the lower bounds on the
H(M23) and H(M31) as shown in the following theorem which is proved in Appendix D.
Theorem 5. Consider any secure protocol Π(pXY , pZ|XY ), where pXY has full support and pZ|XY is
in normal form.
1. Suppose the function pZ|XY satisfies Condition 1 of Lemma 3, that is, there is no non-trivial partition
X = X1 ∪ X2 (i.e., X1 ∩ X2 = ∅ and neither X1 nor X2 is empty), such that if Zk = {z ∈ Z : x ∈
Xk, y ∈ Y, p(z|x, y) > 0}, k = 1, 2, their intersection Z1 ∩ Z2 is empty. Then, we have the following
strengthening of (17).
H(M31) ≥ sup
pX′
((
sup
pY ′
RI(Y ′;Z ′)
)
+
(
sup
pY ′′
H(X ′, Z ′′|Y ′′)
))
, (19)
where the suprimizations are over distributions pX′ , pY ′ , pY ′′ having full support and the terms in the
right hand side are evaluated using the distribution
pX′Y ′Z′Y ′′Z′′(x
′, y′, z′, y′′, z′′) = pX′(x′)pY ′(y′)pZ|XY (z′|x′, y′)pY ′′(y′′)pZ|XY (z′′|x′, y′′).
2. Suppose the function pZ|XY satisfies Condition 2 of Lemma 3, that is, there is no non-trivial partition
Y = Y1 ∪ Y2 such that if Zk = {z ∈ Z : x ∈ X , y ∈ Yk, p(z|x, y) > 0}, k = 1, 2, their intersection
Z1 ∩ Z2 is empty. Then, we have the following strengthening of (16).
H(M23) ≥ sup
pY ′
((
sup
pX′
RI(X ′;Z ′)
)
+
(
sup
pX′′
H(Y ′, Z ′′|X ′′)
))
, (20)
where the supremizations are over distributions pX′ , pX′′ , pY ′ having full support and the terms in
the right hand side are evaluated using the distribution
pX′Y ′Z′X′′Z′′(x
′, y′, z′, x′′, z′′) = pX′(x′)pY ′(y′)pZ|XY (z′|x′, y′)pX′′(x′′)pZ|XY (z′′|x′′, y′).
Note that in Theorem 2, Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, any choice of pX′Y ′ , pX′ , pX′′ , pY ′ , pY ′′ (with
full support) will yield a lower bound. For a given function, while all choices do yield valid lower bounds,
one is often able to obtain the best lower bound analytically (as in Theorem 7, where it is seen to be
the best as it matches an upper bound) or numerically (as in Theorem 8).
To summarize, for any secure computation problem (pXY , pZ|XY ), expressed in the normal form,
Theorem 1 gives lower bounds on entropies of transcripts on all three links. If pXY has full support
and pZ|XY is in normal form, then for H(M31), our best lower bound is the larger of (3) and (17); for
H(M23), it is the larger of (2) and (16) and for H(M12), it is the larger of (7) and (18). In addition,
if pZ|XY satisfies condition 1 of Lemma 3, then for H(M31), our best lower bound is the larger of (8)
and (19); if pZ|XY satisfies condition 2 of Lemma 3, then for H(M23), our best lower bound is the larger
of (9) and (20).
12
4 Lower Bounds on Randomness
In this section, we provide lower bounds on the amount of randomness required in secure computation
protocols. Although our focus in this paper is not to prove lower bounds on the amount of randomness,
it turns out that we may apply the above lower bounds on communication to derive bounds on the
amount of randomness required. We show in Section 5 that they give tight bounds on randomness
required for the specific functions we analyse.
Definition 1. The randomness required to securely compute a function pZ|XY for input distribution
pXY is defined as
ρ(pXY , pZ|XY ) = inf
Π(pXY ,pZ|XY )
H(V1, V2, V3|X,Y ),
where Vi is the view of party-i at the end of the protocol and infimum is over all secure protocols for
(pXY , pZ|XY ).
We can simplify the entropy term in the above definition as follows.
H(V1, V2, V3|X,Y ) ≥ H(M31,M12,M23|X,Y )
≥ max{H(M31|X,Y ), H(M12|X,Y ), H(M23|X,Y )}.
Since the above inequalities are true for any secure protocol Π(pXY , pZ|XY ), we have
ρ(pXY , pZ|XY ) ≥ max{H(M31|X,Y ), H(M12|X,Y ), H(M23|X,Y )}. (21)
Theorem 6. Consider any secure protocol Π(pXY , pZ|XY ).
1. If the characteristic bipartite graph of pXY is connected, then ρ(pXY , pZ|XY ) ≥ H(M12).
2. If pXY has full support and pZ|XY satisfies Condition 1 of Lemma 3, then ρ(pXY , pZ|XY ) ≥ H(M31).
3. If pXY has full support and pZ|XY satisfies Condition 2 of Lemma 3, then ρ(pXY , pZ|XY ) ≥ H(M23).
Proof. By Lemma 3, we have the following:
1. If the characteristic bipartite graph of pXY is connected, then H(M12|X,Y ) = H(M12). This,
together with (21) implies ρ(pXY , pZ|XY ) ≥ H(M12).
2. If pXY has full support and pZ|XY satisfies Condition 1, then H(M31|X,Y ) = H(M31). This,
together with (21) implies ρ(pXY , pZ|XY ) ≥ H(M31).
3. If pXY has full support and pZ|XY satisfies Condition 2, then H(M23|X,Y ) = H(M23). This,
together with (21) implies ρ(pXY , pZ|XY ) ≥ H(M23).
Hence, we can apply the lower bounds developed in Section 3 to obtain lower bounds on randomness.
If pXY has full support and pZ|XY is in normal form, then for H(M12), our best lower bound is the
larger of (7) and (18). In addition, if pZ|XY satisfies condition 1 of Lemma 3, then for H(M31), our best
lower bound is the larger of (8) and (19); if pZ|XY satisfies condition 2 of Lemma 3, then for H(M23),
our best lower bound is the larger of (9) and (20).
We call a protocol randomness-optimal, if the total number of random bits used by the protocol is
optimal. In all the examples we consider in the next section, the amount of randomness does not depend
on the input distribution pXY as long as they have full support, so, instead of writing ρ(pXY , pZ|XY ),
we simply write ρ(pZ|XY ).
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5 Application to Specific Functions
In this section we consider a few important examples, and apply our generic lower bounds from above
to these examples, to obtain interesting results. While many of these results are natural to conjecture,
they are not easy to prove (see, for instance, Footnote 5).
Optimality of the FKN Protocol. Feige et al. [FKN94] provided a generic (non-interactive) secure
computation protocol for all 3-party functions in our model. This protocol uses a straight-forward
(but “inefficient”) reduction from an arbitrary function to a variant of the oblivious transfer problem,
which we shall call the remote OT function (defined below), and then gives a simple protocol for this
new function. While the resulting protocol is inefficient for most functions, one could ask whether the
protocol that [FKN94] used for remote OT itself is optimal. We use our lower bounds from above to
show that indeed, this is the case.
The remote
(
m
1
)
-OTn2 function, is defined as follows: Alice’s input X = (X0, X1, . . . , Xm−1) is
made up of m bit-strings each of length n, and Bob has an input Y ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}. Charlie
wants to compute Z = f(X,Y ) = XY . Figure 5 in Appendix F.4 gives the simple protocol for this
function from [FKN94] (rephrased as a protocol in our model). It requires nm bits to be exchanged
over the Alice-Charlie (31) link, n + logm bits over the Bob-Charlie (23) link and nm + logm bits
over the Alice-Bob (12) link. The total number of random bits used in the protocol is nm+ logm. In
Appendix F.4, we prove the following theorem, which shows that this protocol is optimal and in fact,
a communication-ideal protocol. We also prove that this protocol is randomness-optimal.
Theorem 7. Any secure protocol Π(pXY ,remote-ot) for computing remote
(
m
1
)
-OTn2 for inputs X
and Y where pXY has full support, must satisfy
H(M31) ≥ nm, H(M23) ≥ n+ logm, and H(M12) ≥ nm+ logm,
ρ(remote-ot) ≥ nm+ logm.
More Functions with Communication-Ideal and Randomness-Optimal Protocols. group-
add, addition in any group has a communication-ideal and randomness-optimal protocol, for any
input distribution with full support (see Appendix F.1). As mentioned in Footnote 5, this is easy
to see for the uniform distribution, and using distribution switching, we can see that the same holds
as long as the input distribution has full support. A more interesting example, is a function called
controlled-erasure that was studied in [DP13]. We resolve the communication complexity of this
secure computation problem fully, by showing that the protocol for this function from [DP13] is in
fact communication-ideal as well as randomness-optimal, again, for every input distribution with full
support.
Separating Secure and Insecure Computation. A basic question of secure computation is whether
it needs more bits to be communicated than the input-size itself (which suffices for insecure computa-
tion). While natural to expect, it is not easy to prove this. In their restricted model, [FKN94] showed a
non-explicit result, that for securely computing most Boolean functions on the domain {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n,
Charlie is required to receive at least 3n− 4 bits, which is significantly more than the 2n bits sufficient
for insecure computation.
remote
(
2
1
)
-OTn2 from above already gives us an explicit example of a function where this is true:
the total input size is 2n + 1, but the communication is at least H(M31) + H(M23) ≥ 3n + 1. To
present an easy comparison to the lower bound of [FKN94], we can consider a symmetrized variant of
remote
(
2
1
)
-OTn2 , in which two instances of remote
(
2
1
)
-OTn2 are combined, one in each direction.
More specifically, X = (A0, A1, a) where A0, A1 are of length (n − 1)/2 (for an odd n) and a is a
single bit; similarly Y = (B0, B1, b); the output of the function is defined as an (n − 1) bit string
f(X,Y ) = (Ab, Ba). Considering (say) the uniform input distribution over X,Y , the bounds for
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remote
(
2
1
)
-OTn2 add up to give us H(M31) ≥ 3(n− 1)/2 + 1 and H(M23) ≥ 3(n− 1)/2 + 1, so that
the communication with Charlie is lowerbounded by H(M31) +H(M23) ≥ 3n− 1.
This compares favourably with the bound of [FKN94] in many ways: our lower bound holds even
in a model that allows interaction; in particular, this makes the gap between insecure computation
(n−1 bits in our case, 2n bits for [FKN94]) and secure computation (about 3n bits for both) somewhat
larger. More importantly, our lower bound is explicit (and tight for the specific function we use),
whereas that of [FKN94] is existential. However, our bound does not subsume that of [FKN94], who
considered Boolean functions. Our results do not yield a bound significantly larger than the input
size, when the output is a single bit. It appears that this regime is more amenable to combinatorial
arguments, as pursued in [FKN94], rather than information theoretic arguments. Finally, for the case
of random Boolean functions, it is plausible that the actual communication cost is exponential in the
input length, but none of the current techniques are capable of delivering such a result. We leave it as
a fascinating open problem to obtain tight bounds in this regime, possibly by combining combinatorial
and information-theoretic approaches.
Separating Secure Computation and Secret Sharing. Another natural separation one expects is
between the amount of communication needed when the views (or transcripts) are generated by a secure
computation protocol, versus when they are generated by an omniscient “dealer” so that the security
requirements are met. As mentioned before, the latter setting corresponds to the share sizes in a CMSS
scheme. Again, while such a separation is expected, it is not very easy to establish this, especially for
explicit examples. It requires us to establish a strong lower bound for the secure computation problem
as well as provide a CMSS scheme that is better. None of the examples considered above yield this
separation.
We establish the separation using the 3-party and function, defined as follows: Alice has an input bit
X, Bob has an input bit Y and Charlie should obtain Z = f(X,Y ) = X ∧Y . There is a CMSS scheme
that achieves log(3) ≤ 1.6 bits of entropy for all three shares M12,M23 and M31 (see Theorem 12).
However, the following lower bounds, proven in Appendix F.5 using numerical optimization, shows that
in a secure computation protocol, H(M12) should be strictly larger than this.
Theorem 8. Any secure protocol Π(pXY ,and) for computing and for inputs X and Y where pXY has
full support over {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n, must satisfy
H(M31) ≥ n log(3), H(M23) ≥ n log(3), and H(M12) ≥ n(1.826),
ρ(and) ≥ n(1.826).
The best known protocol for and (which resembles the CMSS scheme above, and first appeared in
[FKN94]) achieves H(M12) = 1 + log(3), H(M23) = H(M31) = log(3) (see Appendix F.5). Our lower
bounds on H(M31) and H(M23) match with the protocol requirements on these links. The bound on
H(M12) is not known to be tight. The protocol given in Appendix F.5 requires 1 + log(3) random bits
and we prove a lower bound of 1.826.
Open Problems. We close with a brief list of concrete open problems from this work. For secure
computation of and and sum (see Appendix F.2 for sum) there is a gap between the best known upper
bound and our lower bound forM12 link. These specific examples point to challenges in obtaining good
lower bounds. Another important problem is to find an explicit example for a Boolean function in which
the communication to Charlie must be significantly larger than the total input size. Note that [FKN94]
gave an existential result (in their restricted model) and the explicit example in this work does not
have Boolean output. The case of random Boolean functions, where communication being exponential
in the input length is a plausible, but unproven result, was already mentioned.
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A Preliminaries: More Details
Protocol. In an execution of the protocol, (a subset of) the parties receive inputs from the specified
distribution, and exchange messages over private, point-to-point links. Without loss of generality, the
state of the protocol consists only of the inputs received by each party and the bits transmitted on each
link, so far. This is because, as the parties are computationally unbounded, private randomness for a
party can always be resampled at every round conditioned on the inputs, outputs and messages in that
party’s view. Each Πi specifies a distribution over {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ (corresponding to the messages to
be transmitted on the two links party i is connected to) conditioned on the inputs of party i and the
messages in the i-th party’s links so far. For a protocol to be well-formed, we require that the message
sent by one party to another at any round is a codeword in a prefix-free code such that the code itself
is determined by the messages exchanged between the two parties in previous rounds;8 also, we require
8Without such a restriction, we implicitly allow “end-of-message” markers, and the rest of the communication could
have fewer bits than the entropy of the transcript annotated with rounds.
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that with probability 1, the protocol terminates — i.e., it reaches a state when all Πi output empty
strings (it is not important for our lower bounds that the parties realize when this happens).
The final transcript in each of the three links consists of two strings, obtained by simply concate-
nating all the bits sent in each direction on that link, by the time the protocol has terminated.
A Normal Form for Functionality pZ|XY . For a randomized function pZ|XY , define the relation
x ≡ x′ for x, x′ ∈ X to hold if ∀y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z, p(z|x, y) = p(z|x′, y); similarly y ≡ y′ is defined. We also
define z ≡ z′ if there exists a constant c such that ∀x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, p(z|x, y) = c · p(z′|x, y). We say that
pZ|XY is in the normal form if x ≡ x′ ⇒ x = x′, y ≡ y′ ⇒ y = y′ and z ≡ z′ ⇒ z = z′.
It is easy to see that one can transform any randomized function pZ|XY to one in normal form
pZ′|X′Y ′ , with possibly smaller alphabets, so that any secure computation protocol for the former can
be transformed to one for the latter with the same communication costs, and vice versa. (To define X ′,
X is modified by replacing all x in an equivalence class of ≡ with a single representative; Y ′ and Z ′ are
defined similarly. The modification to the protocol, in either direction, is for each party to locally map
X to X ′ etc., or vice versa; notice that the Z ′ to Z map is potentially randomized.) Hence it is enough
to study the communication complexity of securely computing functions in the normal form.
A Normal Form for (pXY , pZ|XY ). We define a normal form for the pair (pXY , pZ|XY ), where pXY
is the input distribution and the randomized function is pZ|XY as follows:
Definition 2. For a pair (pXY , pZ|XY ), define the relations x ∼= x′, y ∼= y′ and z ∼= z′ as follows.
1. Take any x, x′ ∈ X and define Sx,x′ = {y ∈ Y : pXY (x, y) > 0, pXY (x′, y) > 0}. We say that x ∼= x′,
if ∀y ∈ Sx,x′ and z ∈ Z, we have pZ|XY (z|x, y) = pZ|XY (z|x′, y).
2. Take any y, y′ ∈ Y and define Sy,y′ = {x ∈ X : pXY (x, y) > 0, pXY (x, y′) > 0}. We say that y ∼= y′,
if ∀x ∈ Sy,y′ and z ∈ Z, we have pZ|XY (z|x, y) = pZ|XY (z|x, y′).
3. Take z, z′ ∈ Z and define S = {(x, y) : pXY (x, y) > 0}. We say that z ∼= z′, if for some constant
c ≥ 0 and ∀(x, y) ∈ S, we have pZ|XY (z|x, y) = c · pZ|XY (z′|x, y).
A pair (pXY , pZ|XY ) is said to be in normal form if x ∼= x′ ⇒ x = x′, y ∼= y′ ⇒ y = y′, and
z ∼= z′ ⇒ z = z′.
We can assume without loss of generality that (pXY , pZ|XY ) is in normal form. Otherwise, suppose
x, x′ ∈ X , where x 6= x′ and x ∼= x′. In this case we can safely merge x and x′ into a single x∗ without
affecting anything. Now, ∀(y, z) ∈ Y × Z, define pXY (x∗, y) = pXY (x, y) + pXY (x′, y) and
pZ|XY (z|x∗, y) =

pZ|XY (z|x, y) if y ∈ Sx,x′ ,
pZ|XY (z|x, y) if pXY (x, y) ≥ 0 and pXY (x′, y) = 0,
pZ|XY (z|x′, y) if pXY (x, y) = 0 and pXY (x′, y) > 0,
which gives pXY Z(x∗, y, z) = pXY Z(x, y, z) +pXY Z(x′, y, z). Similarly we can merge equivalent y’s. For
z 6= z′ with z ∼= z′, we can merge z and z′ into a single z∗ by defining pZ|XY (z∗|x, y) = pZ|XY (z|x, y) +
pZ|XY (z′|x, y), which gives pXY Z(x, y, z∗) = pXY Z(x, y, z) + pXY Z(x, y, z′).
It is easy to see that one can transform any pair (pXY , pZ|XY ) defined by the given pXY and pZ|XY
to one in normal form (pX′Y ′ , pZ′|X′Y ′) using the above described modification, with possibly smaller
alphabets, so that any secure computation protocol for the former can be transformed to one for the
latter with the same communication costs, and vice versa. The modification to the protocol, in either
direction, is for each party to locally map X to X ′ etc., or vice versa; notice that the Z ′ to Z map
is potentially randomized. Hence, it is enough to study secure computation problems (pXY , pZ|XY ) in
normal form.
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B Entropy Lower Bounds as Communication Lower Bounds
Our interest is in providing bounds on the amount of communication needed. In this paper, we derive
lower bounds on the entropies, H(M12), H(M23), H(M31), of the transcripts on the links. As we argue
below, these bounds will lowerbound the expected number of bits exchanged over the link when we
require that the message (bit string) sent by one party to another in any round is a codeword in a
prefix-free code such that the code itself is determined by the messages exchanged between the two
parties in previous rounds. This is a natural requirement when variable length bit strings are allowed
as messages. Notice that without this restriction, since a party sees the messages in each round rather
than just a concatenation of all the bits sent over the entire protocol, implicit end-of-message markers
are present which may convey implicit information (without being accounted for in communication
complexity which is measured by the length of the transcript). The prefix-free requirement eliminates
the possibility of information being implicitly conveyed through end-of-message markers.
Let us denote byM~ij,t the message sent by party-i to party-j in round-t. Let L~ij,t be the (potentially
random) length in bits of this message, and let Lij =
∑N
t=1 L~ij,t+L~ji,t be the number of bits exchanged
over the link ij in either direction. We are interested in lower bounds for E[Lij ]. We have
H(Mij) =
∞∑
t=1
H(M~ij,t,M~ji,t|M t−1~ij ,M
t−1
~ji
)
≤
∞∑
t=1
H(M~ij,t|M t−1~ij ,M
t−1
~ji
) +H(M~ji,t|M t−1~ij ,M
t−1
~ji
)
(a)
≤
∞∑
t=1
E[L~ij,t] + E[L~ji,t]
= E[Lij ],
where (a) follows from the fact that the prefix-code of which M~ij,t is a codeword, is a function of the
conditioning random variables (M t−1~ij ,M
t−1
~ji
), and hence the conditional entropy H(M~ij,t|M t−1~ij ,M
t−1
~ji
)
is no larger than E[L~ij,t] (by Kraft’s inequality and non-negativity of Kullback-Leibler divergence);
similarly for the second term.
C Connections to Secure Sampling and Correlated Multi-Secret Shar-
ing
Secure Sampling. In secure sampling functionalities, none of the parties receives any input, but
all three parties produce outputs. The functionality is specified by a joint distribution pXY Z and the
protocol for sampling pXY Z is specified by Π(pXY Z). The correctness condition in this case is that the
outputs of Alice, Bob and Charlie are distributed according to pXY Z . The security conditions remain
the same as in the case of secure computation, that is, none of the parties can infer anything about the
other parties’ outputs other than what they can from their own outputs.
A Normal Form for pXY Z . For a joint distribution pXY Z , define the relation x ∼ x′ for x, x′ ∈ X to
hold if ∃c ≥ 0 such that ∀y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z, p(x, y, z) = c ·p(x′, y, z). Similarly, we define y ∼ y′ for y, y′ ∈ Y
and z ∼ z′ for z, z′ ∈ Z. We say that pXY Z is in the normal form if x ∼ x′ ⇒ x = x′, y ∼ y′ ⇒ y = y′
and z ∼ z′ ⇒ z = z′.
It is easy to see that one can transform any distribution pXY Z to one in normal form pX′Y ′Z′ , with
possibly smaller alphabets, so that any secure sampling protocol for the former can be transformed to
one for the latter with the same communication costs, and vice versa. (To define X ′, X is modified by
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removing all x such that p(x) = 0 and then replacing all x in an equivalence class of ∼ with a single
representative; Y ′ and Z ′ are defined similarly. The modification to the protocol, in either direction, is
for each party to locally mapX toX ′ etc., or vice versa.) Hence it is enough to study the communication
complexity of securely sampling distributions in the normal form.
Now, we show an analog of Lemma 2 for secure sampling protocols.
Lemma 6. Suppose pXY Z is in normal form. Then, in any secure sampling protocol Π(pXY Z), the
cut isolating Alice from Bob and Charlie must determine Alice’s output X, i.e., H(X|M12,M31) = 0.
Similarly, H(Y |M12,M23) = 0 and H(Z|M23,M31) = 0.
Proof. We only proveH(X|M12,M31) = 0; the other ones, i.e.,H(Y |M12,M23) = 0 andH(Z|M23,M31) =
0 are similarly proved. We need to show that for every m12,m31 with p(m12,m31) > 0, there is a (nec-
essarily unique) x ∈ X such that p(x|m12,m31) = 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that we have a secure
sampling protocol resulting in a p.m.f. p(x, y, z,m12,m31) such that there exists x, x′ ∈ X , x 6= x′ and
m12,m31 satisfying p(m12,m31) > 0, p(x|m12,m31) > 0 and p(x′|m12,m31) > 0. Since p(m12,m31) > 0
and p(x|m12,m31) > 0 imply pX(x) > 0, there exists (y, z) s.t. pXY Z(x, y, z) > 0.
(i) The definition of a protocol implies that p(x, y, z,m12,m31) can be written as
pY Z(y, z)p(m12,m31|y, z)p(x|m12,m31).
(ii) Privacy against Alice implies that p(x, y, z,m12,m31) can be written as
pXY Z(x, y, z)p(m12,m31|x).
(iii) (i) and (ii) gives
pY Z(y, z)p(m12,m31|y, z)p(x|m12,m31) = pXY Z(x, y, z)p(m12,m31|x).
By assumption, p(m12,m31) > 0 and p(x|m12,m31) > 0, which imply that p(m12,m31|x) > 0. And since
pXY Z(x, y, z) > 0, we have from (iii) that p(m12,m31|y, z) > 0. Now consider (x′, y, z). By assumption,
p(m12,m31) > 0 and p(x′|m12,m31) > 0, which imply p(m12,m31|x′) > 0. Since p(m12,m31|y, z) > 0
from above, (iii) implies that pXY Z(x′, y, z) > 0. Define α , p(x,y,z)p(x′,y,z) . Since pXY Z is in normal form,
∃(y′, z′) ∈ (Y,Z) s.t. pXY Z(x, y′, z′) 6= α · pXY Z(x′, y′, z′). Since α 6= 0, at least one of p(x, y′, z′) or
p(x′, y′, z′) is non-zero. Assume that any one of these is non-zero, then applying the above arguments
will give us that the other one should also be non-zero.
(iv) Dividing the expression in (iii) by the one we obtain when we apply the above arguments to (x′, y, z)
gives p(x|m12,m31)p(x′|m12,m31) = α ·
p(m12,m31|x)
p(m12,m31|x′) .
(v) Repeating (i)-(iv) for (x, y′, z′) and (x′, y′, z′), we get p(x|m12,m31)p(x′|m12,m31) 6= α·
p(m12,m31|x)
p(m12,m31|x′) , which contradicts
(iv).
Theorem 9. Any secure sampling protocol Π(pXY Z), where pXY Z is in normal form, should satisfy
the following lower bounds on the entropy of the transcripts on each link.
H(M23) ≥ RI(X;Z) +RI(X;Y ) +H(Y, Z|X),
H(M31) ≥ RI(Y ;Z) +RI(X;Y ) +H(X,Z|Y ),
H(M12) ≥ RI(X;Z) +RI(Y ;Z) +H(X,Y |Z).
Proof. From Lemma 6, we have H(X|M12,M31) = 0, H(Y |M12,M23) = 0 and H(Z|M23,M31) = 0.
Note that we can apply Lemma 4 for secure sampling of dependent X, Y and Z, because, in the
beginning, parties only have independent randomness, but no inputs. In the end, they output from a
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joint distribution pXY Z , where X, Y and Z may be dependent, but this does not affect the requirements
of Lemma 4 in any way. The proof for H(M23) is given below; the other two bounds follows similarly.
H(M23) = I(M12;M23) +H(M23|M12)
= I(M12;M23) + I(M31;M23|M12) +H(M23|M12,M31)
(a)
≥ I(M12;M23|M31) + I(M31;M23|M12) +H(M23|M12,M31)
(b)
≥ RI(X;Z) +RI(X;Y ) +H(Y, Z|X),
where (a) used I(M12;M23) ≥ I(M12;M23|M31), which follows from Lemma 4; (b) used I(M12;M23|M31) ≥
RI(X;Z), I(M31;M23|M12) ≥ RI(X;Y ) and H(M23|M12,M31) ≥ H(Y, Z|X), which we have shown
in the proof of Theorem 1.
We remark that if the marginal distributions satisfy pXY = pXpY (i.e., X and Y are independent),
then a secure computation protocol for pZ|XY can be turned into a secure sampling protocol (with the
same communication costs), by having Alice and Bob locally sample inputs X and Y according to pX
and pY and then run the computation protocol. So, whenever X and Y are independent, the lower
bounds on communication for secure sampling imply lower bounds for secure computation.
Correlated Multi-Secret Sharing Schemes. We define a notion of secret-sharing, called Correlated
Multi-Secret Sharing (CMSS) that is closely related to secure sampling/computation problem. We will
show that lower bounds on the entropy of shares of such secret-sharing schemes will also be lower bounds
on entropy of transcripts for the corresponding secure computation protocols. However, we shall show a
separation between the efficiency of secret-sharing (where there is an omniscient dealer) and a protocol,
using the stronger lower bounds we have established in Section 3.
Definition 3. Given a graph G = (V,E), an adversary structure A ⊆ 2V , and a joint distribution
p(Xv)v∈V over random variables Xv indexed by v ∈ V , a correlated multiple secret sharing scheme for
(G, p(Xv)v∈V ) defines a distribution p(Me)e∈E |(Xv)v∈V of shares Me for each edge e ∈ E, such that the
following hold. Below, for S ⊆ E, MS stands for the collection of all Me for e ∈ S; similarly XT is
defined for T ⊆ V ; Ev ⊆ E denotes the set of edges incident on a vertex V .
• Correctness: For all v ∈ V , H(Xv|MEv) = 0.
• Privacy: For every set T ∈ A, let ET = ∪v∈TEv; then, I(XT ;MET |XT ) = 0.
Below we give a specialised version of the above general definition which is suitable to our setting,
where G is the clique over the vertex set V = {1, 2, 3}, and A = {{1}, {2}, {3}} (corresponding to
1-privacy).
We define Σ to be a correlated multi-secret sharing scheme for a joint distribution pXY Z (with respect
to our fixed adversary structures) if it probabilistically maps secrets (X,Y, Z) to shares M12,M23,M31
such that the following conditions hold:
• Correctness: H(X|M12,M31) = H(Y |M12,M23) = H(Z|M23,M31) = 0.
• Privacy:
I((M12,M31); (Y,Z)|X) = 0 (privacy against Alice),
I((M12,M23); (X,Z)|Y ) = 0 (privacy against Bob),
I((M23,M31); (X,Y )|Z) = 0 (privacy against Charlie).
We point out that while the correctness condition relates only to the supports of X, Y and Z individ-
ually, the privacy condition is crucially influenced by the joint distribution.
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Theorem 10. Any CMSS scheme for any joint distribution pXY Z satisfies
H(M12) ≥ max{RI(X;Z), RI(Y ;Z)}+H(X,Y |Z),
H(M23) ≥ max{RI(X;Z), RI(X;Y )}+H(Y,Z|X),
H(M31) ≥ max{RI(Y ;Z), RI(X;Y )}+H(X,Z|Y ).
Proof. We proceed along the lines of the proof of Theorem 1, except that here we do not need Lemma 2
to argue that H(X|M12,M31) = H(Y |M12,M23) = H(Z|M23,M31) = 0, instead, these follow from the
correctness of CMSS.
If pXY Z = pXY pZ|XY , where (pXY , pZ|XY ) is in normal form, using Lemma 2, the bounds in
Theorem 10 imply bounds in Theorem 1. If pXY Z has full support, then we can further strengthen the
bounds in Theorem 10 by applying distribution switching.
Theorem 11. Consider any CMSS scheme for a joint distribution pXY Z , where pXY Z has full support.
1. H(M12) ≥ max{suppX′Y ′Z′ (RI(X ′;Z ′) +H(X ′, Y ′|Z ′)) , suppX′Y ′Z′ (RI(Y ′;Z ′) +H(X ′, Y ′|Z ′))},
where pX′Y ′Z′ is any distribution for which the characteristic bipartite graph of pX′Y ′ is connected.
2. H(M23) ≥ max{suppX′Y ′Z′ (RI(X ′;Z ′) +H(Y ′, Z ′|X ′)) , suppX′Y ′Z′ (RI(X ′;Y ′) +H(Y ′, Z ′|X ′))},
where pX′Y ′Z′ is any distribution for which the characteristic bipartite graph of pY ′Z′ is connected.
3. H(M31) ≥ max{suppX′Y ′Z′ (RI(Y ′;Z ′) +H(X ′, Z ′|Y ′)) , suppX′Y ′Z′ (RI(X ′;Y ′) +H(X ′, Z ′|Y ′))},
where pX′Y ′Z′ is any distribution for which the characteristic bipartite graph of pX′Z′ is connected.
Proof. First we observe that we can apply distribution switching to CMSS schemes also, i.e., if we have
a CMSS Σ(pXY Z), where pXY Z has full support, it will remain a CMSS if we change the distribution
to a different one pX′Y ′Z′ . This follows from the correctness and privacy conditions of a CMSS. Pro-
ceeding as in the proof of Lemma 3, we can show that for any CMSS Σ(pXY Z), connectedness of the
characteristic bipartite graph of pXY implies I(X,Y, Z;M12) = 0. The other two, i.e., connectedness
of the characteristic bipartite graph of pXZ implies I(X,Y, Z;M31) = 0 and connectedness of the char-
acteristic bipartite graph of pY Z implies I(X,Y, Z;M23) = 0, follow similarly. Now, we can apply the
distribution switching to the bounds in Theorem 10.
It is easy to see that any secure sampling protocol Π(pXY Z), where pXY Z is in normal form, yields
a CMSS scheme for the same joint distribution pXY Z : An omniscient dealer can always produce the
shares M12,M23,M31 which are precisely the transcripts produced by the secure sampling protocol.
Now, correctness for this CMSS follows from Lemma 6, and privacy of CMSS scheme follows from the
privacy of the secure sampling protocol. Thus the lower bounds on the transcripts produced by a CMSS
scheme for a given pXY Z in normal form, gives lower bounds on the corresponding links for any secure
sampling protocol for this pXY Z . If pXY Z = pXY pY |XY , where (pXY , pZ|XY ) is in normal form, then
lower bounds for CMSS schemes provide lower bounds for secure computation problems. As we discuss
in page 15, this lower bound is not tight in general, i.e., there is a function (in fact the and function)
for which there is a CMSS scheme which requires less communication than what our lower bound for
secure computation for that function provides. Towards this, here we give upper bounds on the share
sizes of a 3-party CMSS for and which is defined as X and Y independent and uniformly distributed
bits, and Z = X ∧ Y .
Theorem 12. For pXY Z such that X and Y independent and uniformly distributed bits, and Z = X∧Y ,
there is a CMSS Σ(pXY Z) which has H(M12) = H(M23) = H(M31) = log(3).
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Proof. Consider a CMSS scheme Σ defined as follows. Let (α, β, γ) be a random permutation of the
set {0, 1, 2}. Let M12 = α, and
M31 =
{
α if X = 1
β if X = 0
M23 =
{
α if Y = 1
γ if Y = 0
It can be seen that this scheme satisfies the correctness and privacy requirements (in particular,
(M12,M31) is uniformly random, conditioned on M12 = M31 when X = 1 and conditioned on M12 6=
M31 when X = 0). H(MΣ12) = H(MΣ23) = H(MΣ31) = log 3 < 1.585.
Theorem 11 implies that this scheme is optimal.
D Proofs of the Main Theorems
Proof of Theorem 4. Here, we prove our lower bounds only for independent inputs, i.e., pXY = pXpY ,
but as we show in Appendix G, they also hold for dependent inputs pXY with full support.
Suppose we have a secure protocol for computing pZ|XY in the normal form under pX , pY which
have full support. Consider H(M23),
H(M23) = I(M23;M12) + I(M23;M31|M12) +H(M23|M12,M31).
By Lemma 5, M23 is independent of X. So, by distribution switching, we know that we may switch
the distribution of X to, say, pX′′ which also has full support and the resulting M23 has the same
distribution as under pX , i.e.,
H(M23) = sup
pX′′
I(M23;M12) + I(M23;M31|M12) +H(M23|M12,M31).
Under this switched distribution, let us consider the first term I(M23;M12). Let us notice that, by
privacy against Bob, (M23,M12) must again be independent of X ′′. Hence, even if we switch the
distribution of X to, say pX′ , the joint distribution of (M23,M12) must remain unchanged. Hence, we
have that I(M23;M12) under the distribution pX′′ is the same as that under pX′ . Therefore,
H(M23) =
(
sup
pX′
I(M23;M12)
)
+
(
sup
pX′′
I(M23;M31|M12) +H(M23|M12,M31)
)
.
Now proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 3, we have
H(M23) ≥
(
sup
pX′
RI(X ′;Z ′)
)
+
(
sup
pX′′
H(Y,Z ′′|X ′′)
)
.
The bound on H(M31) follows in an identical fashion. To see the bounds on H(M12), let us recall that
M12 is independent of X,Y (by Lemma 3) and hence we may switch the distributions of both X and
Y . Furthermore, let us note that we may write H(M12) in two different ways.
H(M12) = [I(M12;M31)] + [I(M12;M23|M31) +H(M12|M23,M31)] (22)
H(M12) = [I(M12;M23)] + [I(M12;M31|M23) +H(M12|M23,M31)]. (23)
Using (22) and proceeding as we did for H(M23) leads to the top row of the right hand side of (18),
and (23) leads to the bottom row.
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Proof of Theorem 5. Here, we prove our lower bounds only for independent inputs, i.e., pXY = pXpY ,
but as we show in Appendix G, they also hold for dependent inputs pXY with full support.
In the proof of Lemma 3, we show that under condition 1, M31 is independent of both X,Y . This
allows us to switch the distribution of both X and Y as we did for bounding H(M12) in the proof of
Theorem 4. Proceeding in an identical fashion as there leads us to (19). Similarly, under condition 2,
M23 is independent of X,Y which leads to (20).
E Proofs Omitted from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 2. First we will show H(X|M12,M13) = 0; the other one, i.e. H(Y |M12,M23) = 0, is
similarly proved. We apply a cut-set argument. Consider the cut isolating Alice from Bob and Charlie.
We need to show that for everym12,m31 with p(m12,m31) > 0, there is a (necessarily unique) x ∈ X
such that p(x|m12,m31) = 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that we have a secure protocol resulting in a
p.m.f. p(x, y, z,m12,m31) such that there exists x, x′ ∈ X , x 6= x′ andm12,m31 satisfying p(m12,m31) >
0, p(x|m12,m31) > 0 and p(x′|m12,m31) > 0. For these x, x′, since (pXY , pZ|XY ) is in the normal form,
∃(y, z) ∈ Y × Z such that pXY (x, y) > 0, pXY (x′, y) > 0 and pZ|X,Y (z|x, y) 6= pZ|X,Y (z|x′, y).
(i) The definition of a protocol implies that p(x, y, z,m12,m31) can be written as
pX,Y (x, y)p(m12,m31|x, y)p(z|m12,m31, y).
(ii) Privacy against Alice implies that p(m12,m31|x, y, z) = p(m12,m31|x).
(iii) Using (ii) in (i), we get p(x, y, z,m12,m31) = pX,Y (x, y)p(m12,m31|x)p(z|m12,m31, y).
(iv) Correctness and (ii) imply that we can also write
p(x, y, z,m12,m31) = pX,Y (x, y)pZ|X,Y (z|x, y)p(m12,m31|x).
(v) Since pX,Y (x, y)p(m12,m31|x) > 0, from (iii) and (iv), we get p(z|m12,m31, y) = pZ|X,Y (z|x, y).
Applying the above arguments to (x′, y, z,m12,m31), we get p(z|m12,m31, y) = pZ|X,Y (z|x′, y), lead-
ing to the contradiction p(z|m12,m31, y) 6= p(z|m12,m31, y), since by assumption pZ|X,Y (z|x, y) 6=
pZ|X,Y (z|x′, y).
For H(Z|M23,M31) = 0, we need to show that for every m23,m31 with p(m23,m31) > 0, there is
a (necessarily unique) z ∈ Z such that p(z|m23,m31) = 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that we have a
secure protocol resulting in a p.m.f. p(x, y, z,m23,m31) such that there exists z, z′ ∈ Z, z 6= z′ and
m23,m31 satisfying p(m23,m31) > 0, p(z|m23,m31) and p(z′|m23,m31) > 0. Since (pXY , pZ|XY ) is in
normal form, there exists (x, y) s.t. pXY (x, y) > 0 and pZ|X,Y (z|x, y) > 0.
(i) The definition of a protocol implies that p(x, y, z,m23,m31) can be written as
pX,Y (x, y)p(m23,m31|x, y)p(z|m23,m31).
(ii) Privacy against Charlie implies that p(x, y, z,m23,m31) can be written as
pX,Y (x, y)p(z|x, y)p(m23,m31|z).
(iii) (i) and (ii) gives
p(m23,m31|x, y)p(z|m23,m31) = pZ|X,Y (z|x, y)p(m23,m31|z).
By assumption, p(m23,m31) > 0 and p(z|m23,m31) > 0, which imply that p(m23,m31|z) > 0. And since
pZ|X,Y (z|x, y) > 0, we have from (iii) that p(m23,m31|x, y) > 0. Now consider (x, y, z′). By assumption,
p(m23,m31) > 0 and p(z′|m23,m31) > 0, which imply p(m23,m31|z′) > 0. Since p(m23,m31|x, y) > 0
from above, (iii) implies that pZ|X,Y (z′|x, y) > 0. Define α , p(z|x,y)p(z′|x,y) . Since (pXY , pZ|XY ) is in normal
form, ∃(x′, y′) ∈ (X ,Y) s.t. pXY (x′, y′) > 0 and pZ|X,Y (z|x′, y′) 6= α · pZ|X,Y (z′|x′, y′). Since α 6= 0,
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at least one of p(z|x′, y′) or p(z′|x′, y′) is non-zero. Assume that any one of these is non-zero, then
applying the above arguments will give us that the other one should also be non-zero.
(iv) Dividing the expression in (iii) by the one we obtain when we apply the above arguments to (x, y, z′)
gives p(z|m23,m31)p(z′|m23,m31) = α ·
p(m23,m31|z)
p(m23,m31|z′) .
(v) Repeating (i)-(iv) for (x′, y′, z) and (x′, y′, z′), we get p(z|m23,m31)p(z′|m23,m31) 6= α·
p(m23,m31|z)
p(m23,m31|z′) , which contradicts
(iv).
Proof of Lemma 3.
1. To show I(X,Y, Z;M12) = 0, we need only show that I(X;M12) = 0, since I(X,Y, Z;M12) =
I(X;M12) + I(Y,Z;M12|X) and the second term is equal to zero by the privacy against Alice.
For I(X;M12) = 0, we need to show that p(m12|x) = p(m12|x′) for all x, x′ ∈ X . Take some
x, x′ ∈ X , x 6= x′. Suppose there is a y ∈ Y s.t. pXY (x, y) > 0, pXY (x′, y) > 0. Then, by
privacy against Alice p(m12, x, y) = pX,Y (x, y)p(m12|x) and by privacy against Bob p(m12, x, y) =
pX,Y (x, y)p(m12|y). By comparing these two, we get p(m12|x) = p(m12|y). Applying the above
arguments to (m12, x′, y) gives p(m12|x′) = p(m12|y). Hence, p(m12|x) = p(m12|x′).
Connectedness of the characteristic bipartite graph of pXY implies that for every x, x′ ∈ X , there is
a sequence x0 = x, x1, x2, . . . , xL−1, xL = x′ ∈ X such that for every pair (xl−1, xl), l = 1, 2, . . . , L,
there is a yl ∈ Y s.t. pX,Y (xl−1, yl) > 0 and pX,Y (xl, yl) > 0. Hence, p(m12|x) = p(m12|x1) =
p(m12|x2) = . . . = p(m12|x′).
2. To show I(X,Y, Z;M31) = 0 under condition 1, we need only show that I(X;M31) = 0, since
I(X,Y, Z;M31) = I(X;M31) + I(Y,Z;M31|X) and the second term is equal to zero by the privacy
against Alice.
We need to show that p(m31|x) = p(m31|x′) for all x, x′ ∈ X . Take some x, x′ ∈ X , x 6= x′.
Suppose there is a z ∈ Z s.t. pZ|X,Y (z|x, y), pZ|X,Y (z|x′, y′) > 0 for some y, y′ ∈ Y. Then, by
privacy against Alice p(m31, x, z) = pX,Z(x, z)p(m31|x) and by privacy against Charlie p(m31, x, z) =
pX,Z(x, z)p(m31|z). By comparing these two, and since pX,Z(x, z) > 0 (which follows from the
assumption that pX,Y has full support), we get p(m31|x) = p(m31|z). Applying the above arguments
to (x′, z) gives p(m31|x′) = p(m31|z). Hence, p(m31|x) = p(m31|x′).
Condition 1 implies that for every x, x′ ∈ X , there is a sequence x0 = x, x1, x2, . . . , xL−1, xL =
x′ ∈ X such that for every pair (xl−1, xl), l = 1, 2, . . . , L, there is a zl ∈ Z s.t. pZ|X,Y (zl|xl−1, yl),
pZ|X,Y (zl|xl, y′l) > 0 for some yl, y′l ∈ Y. Hence, p(m31|x) = p(m31|x1) = p(m31|x2) = . . . =
p(m31|x′).
3. The other case under condition 2 follows similarly.
Proof of Lemma 4. We will apply induction on the number of rounds of the protocol.
Base case: At the beginning of the protocol, all the transcripts Mγα,Mβγ and Mαβ are empty. So, the
inequality is trivially true.
Inductive step: Assume that the inequality is true at the end of round t, and we prove it for t+ 1. For
simplicity, let us denote the transcript Mγα (similarly others) at the end of round t by Mγα itself and
at the end of round t + 1 by M˜γα. We denote by ∆M , the new message sent in round t + 1 and if
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that message is sent from party γ to party α, we denote it by ∆M ~γα and so M˜γα becomes (Mγα,∆M ~γα).
Observe that we need to consider only three kinds of messages exchanged in round t+ 1, which are
∆M ~βα,∆M ~βγ and ∆M ~γβ . The inequality for other three kinds of messages is similarly proved. Since
the parties do not share any common or correlated randomness, the new message that one party (say,
β) sends to another (say, α) is conditionally independent of the transcript (Mγα) between the other two
parties (γ and α) conditioned on the transcripts (Mαβ,Mβγ) on both of the links to which that party
(namely, β) is associated with. So we have the following:
I(Mγα; ∆M ~βα|Mαβ,Mβγ) = 0, (24)
I(Mγα; ∆M ~βγ |Mαβ,Mβγ) = 0, (25)
I(Mαβ; ∆M ~γβ|Mβγ ,Mγα) = 0. (26)
1. If ∆M = ∆M ~βα, then
I(M˜γα; M˜βγ)
(a)
= I(Mγα;Mβγ)
(b)
≥ I(Mγα;Mβγ |Mαβ)
(c)
= I(Mγα;Mβγ ,∆M ~βα|Mαβ)
≥ I(Mγα︸︷︷︸
M˜γα
;Mβγ︸︷︷︸
M˜βγ
|Mαβ,∆M ~βα︸ ︷︷ ︸
M˜αβ
)
= I(M˜γα; M˜βγ |M˜αβ),
where (a) follows because M˜γα = Mγα and M˜βγ = Mβγ , (b) follows from the induction hypothesis
and (c) follows from (24).
2. If ∆M = ∆M ~βγ , then
I(M˜γα; M˜βγ)
(d)
= I(Mγα;Mβγ ,∆M ~βγ)
≥ I(Mγα;Mβγ)
(e)
≥ I(Mγα;Mβγ |Mαβ)
(f)
≥ I(Mγα︸︷︷︸
M˜γα
;Mβγ ,∆M ~βγ︸ ︷︷ ︸
M˜βγ
|Mαβ︸︷︷︸
M˜αβ
)
= I(M˜γα; M˜βγ |M˜αβ),
where (d) follows because M˜γα = Mγα and M˜βγ = (Mβγ ,∆M ~βγ), (e) follows from the induction
hypothesis and (f) follows from (25).
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3. If ∆M = ∆M ~γβ , then
I(M˜γα; M˜βγ)
(g)
= I(Mγα;Mβγ ,∆M ~γβ)
= I(Mγα;Mβγ) + I(Mγα; ∆M ~γβ|Mβγ)
(h)
= I(Mγα;Mβγ) + I(Mγα; ∆M ~γβ|Mβγ) + I(Mαβ; ∆M ~γβ|Mβγ ,Mγα)
= I(Mγα;Mβγ) + I(Mγα,Mαβ; ∆M ~γβ|Mβγ)
(i)
≥ I(Mγα;Mβγ |Mαβ) + I(Mγα; ∆M ~γβ|Mβγ ,Mαβ)
= I(Mγα︸︷︷︸
M˜γα
;Mβγ ,∆M ~γβ︸ ︷︷ ︸
M˜βγ
|Mαβ︸︷︷︸
M˜αβ
)
= I(M˜γα; M˜βγ |M˜αβ),
where (g) follows because M˜γα = Mγα and M˜βγ = (Mβγ ,∆M ~γβ), (h) follows from (26) and (i)
follows from the induction hypothesis.
F Details omitted from Section 5
F.1 Secure Computation of group-add
Let G be a (possibly non-abelian) group with binary operation +. The function group-add is defined
as follows: Alice has an input X ∈ G, Bob has an input Y ∈ G and Charlie should get Z = f(X,Y ) =
X + Y .
In Figure 2, we recapitulate a well-known simple protocol for securely computing the above function.
The protocol requires a |G|-ary symbol to be exchanged per computation over each link. As we show
below, this protocol is easily seen to be optimal in terms of expected number of bits on each link as well
as the amount of randomness. For vectors X,Y ∈ Gn, we write X + Y to denote the component-wise
computation.
Algorithm 1: Secure Computation of group-add
Require: Alice & Bob have input vectors X,Y ∈ Gn.
Ensure: Charlie securely computes the component-wise
Z = X + Y.
1: Charlie samples n i.i.d. uniformly distributed elements K = (K1,K2, . . . ,Kn) from G using his
private randomness; sends it to Bob as M ~32 = K.
2: Bob sends M ~21 = Y +M ~32 to Alice.
3: Alice sends M ~13 = X +M ~21 to Charlie.
4: Charlie outputs Z = M ~13 −K.
Figure 2 An optimal protocol for secure computation in any group G. The protocol requires a |G|-ary symbol to be
exchanged per computation over each link.
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Theorem 13. Any secure protocol for computing in a Group G, where pXY has full support over
Gn ×Gn, must satisfy
H(M12), H(M23), H(M31) ≥ n log |G|,
ρ(GROUP-ADD) ≥ n log |G|.
Proof. It is easy to see that the above function satisfies Condition 1 and Condition 2 of Lemma 3. We
will only need the last terms (corresponding to the naïve boundsH(X ′, Y ′|Z ′) etc., but with distribution
switching) of (7), (8) and (9) for H(M12), H(M31) and H(M23) respectively. Since we are computing
a deterministic function, and Y can be determined from (X,Z), the last terms in each of the these
bounds will reduce to the following:
H(M12) ≥ sup
pX′Y ′
H(X ′|Z ′),
H(M31) ≥ sup
pX′Y ′
H(X ′|Y ′),
H(M23) ≥ sup
pX′Y ′
H(Y ′|X ′).
The optimum bounds for M12, M31 and M23 are obtained by taking X ′ and Y ′ to be independent and
uniform over Gn, which gives H(M12), H(M31), H(M23) ≥ n log |G|.
From Theorem 6 and the above bound on H(M12), we have ρ(GROUP-ADD) ≥ n log |G|, which
implies that the above protocol is randomness-optimal.
F.2 Secure Computation of sum
The sum function is defined as follows: Alice and Bob have one bit input X ∈ {0, 1} and Y ∈ {0, 1}
respectively. Charlie wants to compute the arithmetic sum Z = f(X,Y ) = X+Y . Figure 3 recapitulates
a simple protocol for this function. This protocol requires a ternary symbol to be exchanged per
computation over each link. We show in below that our bounds give H(M31), H(M23) ≥ log(3) and
H(M12) ≥ 1.5. Thus, while the protocol matches the lower bound on H(M31) and H(M23), there is a
gap for H(M12). While the protocol requires H(M12) = log(3), the lower bound is only H(M12) ≥ 1.5.
We also show that this protocol is randomness-optimal, which proves a recent conjecture of [LA14] for
three users.
For vectors U, V ∈ {0, 1, 2}n, we write U + V to denote the component-wise addition modulo-3.
Algorithm 4: Secure Computation of sum
Require: Alice and Bob have input vectors X,Y ∈ {0, 1}n.
Ensure: Charlie securely computes the component-wise sum Z = X + Y .
1: Charlie samples n i.i.d. uniformly distributed elements K = (K1,K2, . . . ,Kn) from {0, 1, 2} using
his private randomness; sends it to Alice as M ~31 = K.
2: Alice sends M ~12 = M ~31 +X to Bob.
3: Bob sends M ~23 = M ~12 + Y to Charlie.
4: Charlie outputs Z = M ~23 −K.
Figure 3 A protocol to compute sum. The protocol requires a ternary symbol to be exchanged over all the three links
per computation. We show a lower bound of log(3) both on Alice-Charlie and Bob-Charlie links and a lower bound of
1.5 on Alice-Bob link.
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Theorem 14. Any secure protocol for computing sum, where pXY has full support over {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n
must satisfy
H(M31), H(M23) ≥ n log(3) and H(M12) ≥ 1.5n,
ρ(sum) ≥ n log(3).
Proof. It is easy to see that sum satisfies Condition 1 and Condition 2 of Lemma 3. Also, RI(Y ;Z) =
I(Y ;Z) and RI(Z;X) = I(Z;X). It turns out that for H(M31) and H(M23), the bounds in (8) and (9)
are better than (19) and (20) respectively. Since X can be determined from (Y,Z) and Y can be
determined from (X,Z), we can simplify the bounds in (8) and (9) to the following:
H(M31) ≥ sup
pX′Y ′
(
H(Z ′)
)
,
H(M23) ≥ sup
pX′Y ′
(
H(Z ′)
)
.
ForH(M31), taking pX′Y ′(0, 0) = pX′Y ′(1, 1) = 1/3 and pX′Y ′(0, 1) = pX′Y ′(1, 0) = 1/6 givesH(M31), H(M23) ≥
n log(3). For H(M12), the bound in (18) is better than (7) and (18) simplifies to
H(M12) ≥ sup
pX′
{
sup
pY ′
I(Y ′;Z ′) + sup
pY ′′
{
I(X ′;Z ′′) +H(X ′, Y ′′|Z ′′)}} .
The second term simplifies to H(X ′). Taking X ′, Y ′ ∼ Bern(1/2) gives H(M12) ≥ 1.5n.
Since sum satisfies condition 1 of Lemma 3. So, from Theorem 6, we have ρ(sum) ≥ H(M31), which
from the above calculation is lower bounded by n log(3), implying the randomness-optimality of the
above protocol.
F.3 Secure Computation of controlled erasure
The controlled erasure function from [DP13] is shown below. Alice’s input X acts as the “control” which
decides whether Charlie receives an erasure (∆) or Bob’s input Y .
y
x 0 1
0 ∆ ∆
1 0 1
Notice that Charlie always find out Alice’s control bit, but does not learn Bob’s bit when it is erased.
This function does not satisfy Condition 1 of Lemma 3.
Figure 4 gives a protocol (repeated from [DP13]) for securely computing this function on each
location of strings of length n. Bob sends his input string to Charlie under the cover of a one-time
pad and reveals the key used to Alice. Alice sends his input to Charlie compressed using a Huffman
code (replaced by Lempel-Ziv if we want the protocol to be distribution independent). He also sends
to Charlie those key bits he received corresponding to the locations where there is no erasure (i.e.,
where his input bit is 1). When X ∼ Bernoulli(p) and Y ∼ Bernoulli(q), i.i.d., where p, q ∈ (0, 1), the
expected message length for Alice-Charlie link is E[L31] < nH2(p) + 1 + np, the messages lengths on
the other two links are determinisitically n each, L12 = L23 = n. Here we prove the optimality of this
protocol for X ∼ Bernoulli(p) and Y ∼ Bernoulli(q), where p, q ∈ (0, 1); [DP13] only considered the
case where X,Y ∼ Bernoulli(1/2). We also prove that this protocol is randomness-optimal.
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Algorithm 2: Secure Computation of controlled erasure
Require: Alice & Bob have input bits Xn, Y n ∈ {0, 1}n.
Ensure: Charlie securely computes the controlled erasure function
Zi = f(Xi, Yi), i = 1, . . . , n.
1: Bob samples n i.i.d. uniformly distributed bits Kn from his private randomness; sends it to Alice
asM ~21,1 = K
n. Bob sends to Charlie his input Y n masked (bit-wise) with Kn asM ~23,1 = Y
n⊕Kn.
2: Alice sends his input Xn to Charlie compressed using a Huffman code (or Lempel-Ziv if we want
the protocol to not depend on the input distribution of Xn); let c(Xn) be the codeword. Alice also
sends to Charlie the sequence of key bits Ki corresponding to the locations where his input Xi is 1.
M ~12,2 = c(X
n), (Ki)i:Xi=1.
3: Charlie outputs
Zi =
{
∆, if Xi = 0
(Yi ⊕Ki)⊕Ki, if Xi = 1.
Figure 4 A protocol to compute controlled erasure function. For X ∼ Bernoulli(p) and Y ∼ Bernoulli(q), both i.i.d
and p, q ∈ (0, 1), the expected message lengths per bit are E[L31] < n(H2(p) + p) + 1, L12 = n, and L23 = n. We show
that these are asymptotically optimal by showing the following lower bounds: H(M31) ≥ n(H2(p) + p), H(M12) ≥ n and
H(M23) ≥ n.
Theorem 15. Any secure protocol for computing controlled erasure for X ∼ Bernoulli(p) and
Y ∼ Bernoulli(q), both i.i.d., with p, q ∈ (0, 1) over block length n must satisfy
H(M31) ≥ n(H2(p) + p), H(M12) ≥ n, and H(M23) ≥ n,
ρ(controlled-erasure) ≥ n.
Proof. It is easy to see that this function satisfies only Condition 2 of Lemma 3. We also have
RI(X;Z) = 0 and RI(Y ;Z) = I(Y ;Z) for this function. Since Condition 1 of Lemma 3 is not
satisfied, our best bound for H(M31) is given by (17). Since X is independent of Y ′′ in (17) and we are
computing a deterministic function, the bound in (17) simplifies to the following:
H(M31) ≥ sup
pY ′
{
I(Y ′n;Z ′n)
}
+H(Xn).
The optimum bound for H(M31) is obtained by taking Y ′ ∼ Bernoulli(1/2), which gives H(M31) ≥
n(p+H2(p)). For H(M23), we can apply the bound in (9), which simplifies to the following:
H(M23) ≥ sup
pX′Y ′
{
H(Y ′n|X ′n)} .
Taking Y ′ to be independent of X ′ and Y ′ ∼ Bernoulli(1/2) gives H(M31) ≥ n(p+H2(p)). For H(M12),
we can apply the bound in (7), which simplifies to the following:
H(M12) ≥ sup
pX′Y ′
(
I(Y ′;Z ′) +H(X ′, Y ′|Z ′))
= sup
pX′Y ′
(−H(Z ′|Y ′) +H(X ′, Y ′))
(a)
= sup
pX′Y ′
(−H(X ′|Y ′) +H(X ′, Y ′))
= sup
pX′Y ′
(
H(X ′)
)
,
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where (a) follows because, we can determine X from Z and Z is a deterministic function of (X,Y ).
Now, taking X ′ ∼ Bernoulli(1/2) gives H(M12) ≥ n.
From Theorem 6 and the above bound on H(M12), we have ρ(controlled-erasure) ≥ n, which
implies that the above protocol is randomness-optimal.
F.4 Secure Computation of remote
(
m
1
)
-OTn2
Algorithm 3: Secure Computation of remote
(
m
1
)
-OTn2
Require: Alice has m input bit strings X0, X1, . . . , Xn−1 each of length n & Bob has an input Y ∈
{0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}.
Ensure: Charlie securely computes the remote
(
m
1
)
-OTn2 : Z = XY .
1: Alice samples nm+ logm indep., uniformly distributed bits from her private randomness. Denote
the first m blocks each of length n of this random string by K0,K1, . . . ,Km−1 and the last logm
bits by pi. Alice sends it to Bob as M ~12,1 = (K0,K1, . . . ,Km−1, pi).
2: Alice computes M (i) = Xpi+i (mod m) ⊕ Kpi+i (mod m), i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1} and sends to Charlie
M ~13,2 = (M
(0),M (1), . . . ,M (m−1)). Bob computes C = Y − pi (mod m),K = KY and sends to
Charlie M ~23,2 = (C,K).
3: Charlie outputs Z = M (C) ⊕K.
Figure 5 A protocol to securely compute remote
(
m
1
)
-OTn2 , which is a special case of the general protocol given in
[FKN94]. The protocol requires nm bits to be exchanged over the Alice-Charlie (31) link, n + logm bits over the Bob-
Charlie (23) link and nm+ logm bits over the Alice-Bob (12) link. We show optimality of our protocol by showing that
any protocol must exchange an expected nm bits over the Alice-Charlie (31) link, n + logm bite over the Bob-Charlie
(23) link and nm+ logm bits over the Alice-Bob (12) link.
Proof of Theorem 7. remote
(
m
1
)
-OTn2 satisfies Condition 1 and Condition 2 of Lemma 3. We also
have, RI(Y ;Z) = I(Y ;Z) and RI(Z;X) = I(Z;X). It turns out that for H(M31) and H(M23), (8)
and (9) give the same bounds as (19) and (20) respectively. We will consider the bounds in (19) and (20)
in the following. Since X ′ is independent of Y ′′ in (19), X ′′ is independent of Y ′ in (20) and we are
computing a deterministic function, the bounds in (19) and (20) simplify to the following:
H(M31) ≥ sup
pX′
{(
sup
pY ′
I(Y ′;Z ′)
)
+H(X ′)
}
,
H(M23) ≥ sup
pY ′
{(
sup
pX′
I(X ′;Z ′)
)
+H(Y ′)
}
.
Taking X ′ and Y ′ to be uniform, we get H(M31) ≥ nm. To derive a lower bound on H(M23), take
Y ′ ∼ unif{0, 1} and X ′ distributed as below
pX′0,X′1,...,X′m−1(x0, x1, . . . , xm−1) =
{
1
2n − , x0 = x1 = . . . = xm−1
/(2n(m−1) − 1), otherwise,
where  > 0 can be made arbitrarily small to make I(Z ′;X ′) as close to n as desired. This gives a
bound of H(M23) ≥ n+ logm. For H(M12), the bottom row of (18) simplifies to
H(M12) ≥ sup
pY ′
{
sup
pX′
I(X ′;Z ′) + sup
pX′′
{
I(Y ′;Z ′′) +H(X ′′, Y ′|Z ′′)}} .
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Taking Y ′ and X ′′ to be uniform and X ′ to be as below
pX′0,X′1,...,X′m−1(x0, x1, . . . , xm−1) =
{
1
2n − , x0 = x1 = . . . = xm−1
/(2n(m−1) − 1), otherwise,
where  > 0 can be made arbitrarily small to make I(X ′;Z ′) as close to n as desired. This gives a
bound of H(M12) ≥ nm+ logm.
From Theorem 6 and the above bound on H(M12), we have ρ(remote-ot) ≥ nm + logm, which
implies that the above protocol is randomness-optimal.
F.5 Secure Computation of and
Algorithm 5: Secure Computation of and
Require: Alice has an input bit X & Bob has a bit Y .
Ensure: Charlie securely computes the and Z = X ∧ Y .
1: Alice samples a uniform random permutation (α, β, γ) of (0, 1, 2) from her private randomness;
sends it to Bob M ~12 = (α, β, γ) (using a symbol from an alphabet of size 6).
2: Alice sends α to Charlie if X = 1, and β if X = 0. Bob sends α to Charlie if Y = 1, and γ if Y = 1.
M31 =
{
α if X = 1
β if X = 0
M23 =
{
α if Y = 1
γ if Y = 0
3: Charlie outputs Z = 1 if M31 = M23, and 0 otherwise.
Figure 6 A protocol to compute and [FKN94]. The protocol requires a ternary symbol to be exchanged over the Alice-
Charlie (31) and Bob-Charlie (23) links and symbols from an alphabet of size 6 over the Alice-Bob (12) link per and
computation.
Proof of Theorem 8. We will prove the result only for n = 1, i.e., when input consists of only one bit.
The result for general n follows by taking in the following proof X ′is, Y
′
i s and Y
′′
i s to be i.i.d.
It is easy to see that and satisfies Condition 1 and Condition 2 of Lemma 3. Also, RI(Y ;Z) =
I(Y ;Z) and RI(Z;X) = I(Z;X). It turns out that for H(M31) and H(M23), the bounds in (8) and (9)
are better than (19) and (20) respectively. The simplified bounds in (8) and (9) are as follows:
H(M31) ≥ sup
pX′Y ′
(
I(Y ′;Z ′) +H(X ′, Z ′|Y ′)) ,
H(M23) ≥ sup
pX′Y ′
(
I(X ′;Z ′) +H(Y ′, Z ′|X ′)) .
For H(M31), take pX′Y ′(0, 0) = pX′Y ′(1, 0) = pX′Y ′(1, 1) = (1 − )/3 and pX′Y ′(0, 1) = , where  > 0
can be made arbitrarily small to make H(M31) as close to log(3) as we desire.
For H(M23), take pX′Y ′(0, 0) = pX′Y ′(0, 1) = pX′Y ′(1, 1) = (1 − )/3 and pX′Y ′(1, 0) = , where
 > 0 can be made arbitrarily small to make H(M23) as close to log(3) as we desire.
For H(M12), (18) simplifies to
H(M12) ≥ sup
pX′
{
sup
pY ′
I(Y ′;Z ′) + sup
pY ′′
{
I(X ′;Z ′′) +H(X ′, Y ′′|Z ′′)}} .
The second term simplifies to H(X ′) + pX′(0) by taking Y ′′ to be uniform. Taking pX′(1) = 0.456 and
pY ′(1) = 0.397 gives H(M12) ≥ 1.826.
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From Theorem 6 and the above bound on H(M12), we have ρ(AND) ≥ n(1.826), whereas the
protocol requires 1 + log 3 random bits.
Note: We need the use of Lemma 4 (information inequality) only to improve the bound on H(M12)
in remote-ot, sum and and. All other bounds in all other functions do not need the use information
inequality.
G Lower Bounds for Dependent Inputs
We will show that all our lower bounds proven for independent inputs hold for dependent inputs as
well provided the distribution has full support. In Subsection 3.2, we observed that any secure protocol
Π(pXY , pZ|XY ), where distribution pXY has full support, continues to be a secure protocol even if we
switch the input distribution to a different one p
X˜Y˜
.
Since we can switch to any distribution p
X˜Y˜
, in particular, we can switch to p
X˜Y˜
, where X˜ and
Y˜ have the same marginals as X and Y respectively, i.e., p
X˜
(x) = pX(x), ∀x ∈ X and pY˜ (y) =
pY (y),∀y ∈ Y. This allows us to argue that the communication lower bounds for Π(pX˜Y˜ , pZ|XY ) also
hold for Π(pXY , pZ|XY ). To prove this, we show below that the resulting marginal distributions on the
transcripts remain the same as the original ones, implying the same entropies.
Let denote the resulting distribution on the transcript on 12 link by M˜12 and similarly on the other
two links.
p
M˜12
(m12) =
∑
x,y
p
M˜12|X˜Y˜ (m12|x, y)pX˜Y˜ (x, y)
(a)
=
∑
x,y
pM12|XY (m12|x, y)pX˜Y˜ (x, y)
(b)
=
∑
x,y
pM12|X(m12|x)pX˜Y˜ (x, y)
=
∑
x
pM12|X(m12|x)
∑
y
p
X˜Y˜
(x, y)
=
∑
x
pM12|X(m12|x)pX˜(x)
=
∑
x
pM12|X(m12|x)pX(x)
= pM12(m12),
where (a) follows from the fact that in a secure computation protocol, once Alice and Bob are given
inputs X = x and Y = y respectively, the protocol produces (m12,m23,m31, z) according to the
conditional distribution pM12M23M31Z|XY (m12,m23,m31, z|x, y) and this conditional distribution does
not depend on the distribution pXY , hence, pM˜12|X˜Y˜ (m12|x, y) = pM12|XY (m12|x, y); and (b) follows
from privacy against Alice. This implies that H(M˜12) = H(M12). Similarly we can prove H(M˜23) =
H(M23) and H(M˜31) = H(M31).
Proofs of our lower bounds for secure computation in Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 assumed inde-
pendent inputs. For them to hold for dependent ones, we can take p
X˜Y˜
in above to be a product
distribution p
X˜Y˜
= p
X˜
p
Y˜
with X˜ and Y˜ having the same marginals as X and Y .
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H Dependence on Input Distributions
Our communication lower bounds were developed for protocols whose designs may take into account
the distributions of X and Y . Specifically, the right hand sides of (7) and (18) do not depend on
the distributions pXpY of the inputs. Thus, even though we allow the protocol to depend on the
distributions, our lower bound on H(M12) does not. The same is true for (8) and (19) for H(M31)
and (9) and (20) for H(M23), which apply when the function satsifies certain conditions. As the
controlled-erasure example (Appendix F.3) demonstrates, when these conditions are not satisfied,
the communication complexity of the optimal protocol may indeed depend on the distribution of the
input. Notice that the specific protocols we have given in this paper do not need the knowledge of the
input distributions.
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